Citizens Proposal for a Border between Israel and Palestine

Andrew M. Wilson
Louise B. Strait
Antonio L. Betancourt

www.israel-palestine-border.org
About the Authors

Dr. ANDREW M. WILSON is the author of World Scripture: A Comparative Anthology of Sacred Texts (Paragon House, 1991), a comparative anthology that contains over 4,000 passages from 268 sacred texts of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Jainism, Sikhism, Baha’i, and more. Also featured are the traditions, prayers and proverbs of the First Peoples of Africa, the Americas and Oceania. Clergy, scholars, and practitioners of multiple faith traditions have applauded it as a contribution to comparative religion and a resource for interfaith worship. The online version of World Scripture is linked to by many collegiate and independent websites as a comparative religion resource. Dr. Wilson has a Ph.D. from Harvard University in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations and has published on Jewish–Christian relations in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies. His interest in Israeli–Palestinian relations has led him to take more than a dozen trips to Israel, Ramallah and Gaza.

Dr. Wilson is Professor of Scriptural Studies at UTS: The Interfaith Seminary (New York City), the main seminary of the international Unification Church. Nevertheless, in undertaking the work to develop the proposal for a border, he received neither church support nor the endorsement of any church officials. He states, “I am offering this proposal as an individual citizen who cares deeply about peace in a way that transcends my personal religious beliefs. I believe that the spiritual maturity that grows out of a life of faith has positioned me to make a contribution to the wider discussion.”

LOUISE B. STRAIT accompanied Dr. Wilson on several of his trips to Israel and the Palestinian territories. An elder in the Presbyterian Church (P.C.U.S.A.), she is active in interfaith activities in the Washington D.C. area. Her interest in peace has been fostered by the strong peace witness of the Society of Friends, which she encountered in her education at the Quaker-affiliated Sidwell Friends School and Earlham College. An editor of periodicals by profession, Ms. Strait is currently employed by the American Psychological Association.

Dr. ANTONIO L. BETANCOURT is the Secretary General of the Summit Council for World Peace, an association of former heads of state and government established in 1981. He also serves as President of the World Institute for Development and Peace, a think tank devoted to economic justice and resource developer on ideas and technologies to address more effectively the problems of poverty. Previously, he served as Executive Vice President of the International Security Council, a Washington, DC-based defense and foreign policy think tank, and was Executive Editor of Global Affairs, its quarterly journal.

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Introduction

THE CITIZENS PROPOSAL FOR A BORDER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE is the result of efforts to create a border that would equally respect the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians. We also see the value of this border in providing a context for modifying some of the incongruous relationships, built over many decades, between Jews and Arabs. We see the opportunity to tap into the beauty that is both the people of Palestine and the people of Israel in a way that could generate tremendous dividends.

Here we have put forth one specific proposal for a border. We invite both Palestinians and Israelis to examine this proposal and to consider whether they would be satisfied that said border could represent them, or at least serve as a good basis for negotiation.

One would have hoped that at this juncture, Israelis and Palestinians would be making every effort to negotiate a border. Yet in the absence of such negotiations, as citizens of the world community we feel compelled to offer in front of Almighty God another way forward. In no way do we believe that this is the only way forward. However, we believe this is a reasonable way forward, one which can offer ground-breaking possibilities for men, women and children all over the Middle East.

Our conviction comes from our love of God rather than from any innocence or naïveté. Because many citizens of the Middle East are religious, we ourselves have made an effort to be prayerful in arriving at a two-state solution, and not only that, but a solution a solution taking into consideration the political realities, precedents of the past, and hopes for the future.

We support the international efforts and investment of the United States, the European Union, and other nations as true and well-placed. We do not believe, however, that these efforts have well mapped out all the issues. Here is where we seek to make a contribution. Let the reader take upon him- or herself the obligation to seriously consider whether this proposal would be helpful.
General Issues

A New Perspective on the Problem of Borders

The Citizens Proposal brings in a new perspective, which some might call feminine, to the problem of borders. Instead of conceiving of drawing borders in terms of political contests and struggles over ownership, it emphasizes parameters that make for a peaceful and prosperous life for the people on both sides of the border. They include concern for people’s living environment, attention to process, and the expectation of future economic and political development. Some of the principles used in drafting this proposal include:

- Viewing Palestinians and Israelis as equally deserving of respect and consideration, while also recognizing their different cultural and historical outlooks;
- Balancing the need to minimize the number of people who might be dislocated from their homes with the need for territorial contiguity and a border that causes minimal interference in people’s daily lives;
- Creating and maintaining road links that permit speedy and unobstructed travel between major cities and diminishing the need for lengthy detours to travel between nearby villages;
- Removing obstacles to the growth of urban areas, anticipating that cities such as Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Qalqiliya will expand;
- Setting up joint administration of sensitive areas, to balance the claims of national sovereignty with the need to assure the rights and wellbeing of citizens of the opposite country who live in or who travel through them;
- Anticipating protections for the legal rights for settlers who choose to remain a Jewish minority within Palestine and expecting that they will strive to be good neighbors; and that the Arab minority within Israel will receive better services and support;
- Providing for management of border crossings to encourage the smooth and voluminous flow of people and goods between Israel and Palestine, particularly at the border between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which this proposal has designated the “women’s border”;
- Encouraging magnanimity and humility to assuage the resentment and pain manifest in such demands as the Right of Return; and
- Providing opportunities for Israelis and Palestinians to pursue joint ventures for trade, industry and agriculture, to build stronger links between the two nations.

Access

THIS PROPOSAL CONSISTENTLY approaches the borders issue with the goal to provide viable access—the free flow of people and goods—for both Palestinians and Jews. It is our hope that if this border is adopted, that east–west flow between settlements and Israel will continue, and north–south flow between Jerusalem and Bethlehem will be in the form of vibrant life and
trade. It is understood that even after a Palestinian state is established and the border is negotiated and settled, there will still need to be ongoing negotiation between the two nations to manage the border and preserve access.

We fully endorse the concept that women will need to be regularly consulted on what may or may not be occurring in their nation or in their neighboring nation. Our belief and experience has shown us that when considering points of conflict, a more feminine perspective can often result in meaningful solutions which, more often than not, can win the respect of others. To regulate access across various segments of the border, we suggest that Border Councils be set up, with all or the majority of their members being women, who represent Israel, Palestine, and (in some cases) the world community. We suggest that the laws governing such Border Councils prescribe a democratic selection process, so that their membership would not be dominated by political appointees and would include input from residents on both sides of the border. These Border Councils would be given certain powers to make policy and to regulate the flow of people and goods across borders, consistent with the signed agreements between the two nations.

We are fully aware that many Palestinian communities have been divided, even physically, and can only apologize that the world community is largely unaware of those specific communities. Simple research will take the average reader to places such as Al-Walaja. This community is a poignant example of what can go wrong between two peoples. Over the course of this conflict, one can find many such examples. But, sadly, what we are not seeing is movement towards negotiations to resolve such divisions.

There are many people across the Middle East and throughout the world who would have wished by now that Palestinians and Jews would be having meaningful dialogue, by which they would have found ways to respect the other and to be respected by the other. This border cannot cause people to offer or feel respect, but it can be a starting point towards the day when new citizens of these nations yet to be born will feel hope, gratitude, and appreciation. We are not naïve about this. We understand that both sides must work at fostering respect, and that it is the obligation of the nations and citizens of these nations to continually reach out to the other.

**Culture and Identity**

THIS BORDER PROPOSAL IS NOT MEANT to specifically address the cultural issues within the two nations. Nevertheless, we hope that within the parameters of an agreed-upon border, the citizens of the two nations would develop the culture or maintain the culture that they wish for their nations.

The Citizens Proposal does not see a problem with labeling Israel a “Jewish state” or Palestine an “Arab state.” However, we do see a problem if all citizens in either state are not supported in their aspirations. We would ask each nation to respect the voices of significant numbers of citizens who might object to any such labeling. We do not believe in railroading issues, and we believe that with a more feminine approach, issues can be resolved through process and through effective and committed management.
Land Transfer

This proposal advocates land swaps, in a context of “territorial exchanges,” but it leaves to negotiations what land within Israel is to be exchanged. Such transfers of land could be agreed upon under a number of different criteria, whether a mathematical formula, a percentage calculation, or any of several provisos.

In the negotiations to come, exchanges of territory may allow for a greater range of opportunities, because land transfer is also linked to (a) considerations of citizenship and residency, (b) maintaining territorial contiguity and access, (c) the cross-border flow of people and goods, (d) fostering economic growth, and (e) security concerns. In short, it is far more than land that is being transferred or swapped. Thus, in advocating territorial exchanges, we are also advocating for a much broader sense of exchange, one that can facilitate the negotiation process.

Recognizing an enduring Christian presence in the Middle East, we have adopted a concept that moves away from the biblical dictum of “an eye for an eye.” In seeking to establish an enduring peace, our conviction is to present a more balanced approach. Nevertheless, we do not wish to deny the voice of those who believe that justice requires an exchange of kilometer for kilometer.

As it is, the Citizens Proposal provides for a transfer of 1.9% of Palestinian land to Israel, meeting a similar percentage recently offered by Palestinian negotiators to representatives of the Quartet on November 14, 2011. To be precise, the Citizens Proposal designates 119.62 sq. km. of land east of the 1949 armistice line to Israel, which is 1.94% of the land area demarcated by that line for the West Bank and Gaza but excluding the No-Man’s Land. This figure excludes East Jerusalem, which is defined for purposes of calculation as the areas, primarily with an Arab-majority, from French Hill to East Talpiyot and east to the edge of Ma’ale Adumim (20.48 sq. km.).

Without prejudicing negotiations, the area of East Jerusalem shaded yellow, which is most likely to become part of a Palestinian East Jerusalem, amounts to 12.91 sq. km., or 0.21% of Palestinian land. This leaves 7.57 sq. km., or 0.12%, that could potentially be transferred to Israel, all or in part. Within this most sensitive area, neighborhoods may require fine consideration when the parties begin to map out their differences.

For possible land areas that Israel might cede to Palestine, we call attention to David Makovsky’s proposal. We agree with several of the principles enunciated therein, namely that the ceded land should be suitable for farming or industrial use, and should not involve the transfer or dislocation of large populations of Israeli Arabs into Palestine. It identifies six potential areas for land transfer adjacent to the northern West Bank, southern West Bank and Gaza, with the bulk of the ceded land adjacent to Gaza.

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2 The no-man’s land exists at the Latrun salient, East Talpiyot, and in the center of Jerusalem where two parallel armistice lines separated Israel and Jordan after the end of hostilities in 1948. It amounts to 42.96 sq. km. The total land area of the West Bank and Gaza excluding the no-man’s land is 6220 – 42.96 = 6,177.04 sq. km.
Offering the area of agricultural land on the south-east side of Gaza, as suggested in the Citizens Proposal, would enhance Gaza’s domestic food supply. However, we understand that Israel would be unwilling to cede this territory as long as the government of Gaza foments violence and remains committed to Israel’s destruction. We could envision a peace agreement that marks territory near Gaza for annexation without the annexation being immediately carried out. Short-term implementation issues are less important than demarcating the border, which would thenceforth guide Israeli planning and construction.

**Right of Return**

ONCE A PROPOSED BORDER IS ADOPTED, issues of security and the right of return can be addressed. We do not see a continued exclusion of Palestinians who wish to return to the State of Israel as fundamentally problematic, as long as a quantified number of returnees can be agreed upon by both parties. Our basic starting point for what Israel should offer Palestine for right of return is a minimum of 100,000 people. We believe that this number of returning Palestinians would not negate, change or dilute the character of the State of Israel as it is. The addition of 100,000 Palestinians amounts to only 1.3 percent of Israel’s population (currently 7,473,000).

We offer the suggestion that the State of Israel could develop eight new communities for returnees to initially lodge in. We expect Israel to consult her Arab citizens for locale, and to listen strongly to the voice of local Arabs to determine if they agree on a reasonable quantity of returnees for their locality.

We seek to remove “the sting” of the issue of right of return, but we do not in any way seek to imply that we have fully comprehended the heart, suffering or manifold issues that come with people who would like to return to what commonly has been referred to as the Holy Land.

**Gaza**

WE WOULD LIKE THE WORLD COMMUNITY to conceive of a new environment in Gaza similar to Dubai. We see a golden economic opportunity for the Arab nations of the region to invest some of their oil wealth to finance the development of a modern port. We would like Gaza to be offered rail access to the Gulf of Aqaba, so that goods shipped to Gaza from the Mediterranean region could be transshipped to the Gulf of Aqaba by rail and then reloaded on ships bound for Arabia. We would also like to see Gaza be offered a rail corridor to the West Bank and Amman. This combination of a port and rail links would make Gaza a hub for trade between Europe, Jordan (and Syria), and Arabia.

In this way, Palestinians can have access by rail to come in and out of Gaza. They should also be given access to travel via an international airport in the West Bank. We would ask that at the conclusion of any agreed border, the two nations meet again in 10 to 20 years, if not before, to establish meaningful automobile and vehicular routes across the region. Because we would not assume that an infant state of Palestine would be capable of convincing the population of the State of Israel of its goodwill, we would ask that the positive side of this reality be considered: Should there not be an opportunity for the transfer of goods by rail, even while an established link via a road between Gaza and the West Bank is yet to be seen?
**Security**

SECURITY IS ENHANCED through good borders. As the adage goes, “good fences make good neighbors.” When Israel and the Palestinians have fixed a border that both sides can accept, that in itself will contribute greatly towards positive security environment for Israel. A border with the West Bank will produce a safer and more secure Israel, safer and more secure than what can be gained through occupation, annexation, or expanding settlements in the West Bank.

Once the representatives of Israel and Palestine, with the support of the Quartet and other nations, commit themselves to establishing peace, then on the basis of having established a border, truly considering the options for the right of return, and making a fundamental commitment to the economic well-being of all in the region, the parties will be able to negotiate meaningful security arrangements.

We do not ask the State of Israel to negotiate with a terrorist organization, but we do ask Israel and its Prime Minister to consider negotiating with a broadened sense of what is reasonable. We believe in the possibility that both Hamas and Fatah can offer reasonable assurances that there is goodwill in both territories. We do not believe that any political party must forever operate with the goal of defeating another party according to its pre-printed agenda. We know full well that agendas can change, because political parties are composed of human beings who understandably have interests. Hence, we urge that negotiations commence on the basis of common humanity.

Furthermore, we do not object to provisos being inserted. We believe it is in the best interests of the State of Israel to negotiate with Hamas, but at the same time to clearly establish in writing what Israel will and will not tolerate. This would offer an opening for Hamas to be included, but at the same time for primary negotiations to occur with Fatah. This would also offer a way for Israel to withdraw from negotiations if political developments in the new state of Palestine are seen by the world community as a genuine threat to Israel and her citizens.

At the same time, the world would be foolish to ignore the concerns of Palestine as an infant state over its security issues. However, we strongly object to any proposal that would maintain or establish an initial peace by employing UN peacekeeping forces anywhere within Jerusalem or Palestine.

**Jerusalem**

FOR EVERY SECTION of the border, the issues for each community are different, and for each area there are unique concerns. But fundamentally, none seem to be free to move without movement in Jerusalem. We ask the Knesset and we ask the Palestinian Authority: Put aside your disagreements and conference regularly on the fate of Jerusalem. If we can have a simple, meaningful and peaceful focus on the eastern environs of Jerusalem, it can help narrow down points of contention elsewhere.

The issue of Jerusalem can be solved by looking at it from the perspectives of (1) municipal needs, (2) national needs, whether of one or both nations, and (3) policies that accommodate the needs of the other party.
We do not see that territorial ownership of any part of Jerusalem by one party necessarily negates the interests of the other party within the city. It is not implausible for the nation-state of Palestine to maintain a national government within the eastern environs of Jerusalem, even if East Jerusalem is not forfeited by Israel. We do not object to Palestine inferring or insisting that East Jerusalem is an occupied area. We do, however, object to either party insisting that any solution for peace must include establishing its ownership over East Jerusalem. The Citizens Proposal offers the eastern areas of Jerusalem as a focus that could be negotiated for joint responsibility of governing in the city. But it does not insist upon it.

Despite many people’s aspirations, our proposal defaults Jerusalem to the Israeli side. Nevertheless, it does not acknowledge Israeli annexation. In this point, we stick with the United Nations in refusing to negotiate this sort of result. We observe that certain areas in the world have commonwealth status, for example Puerto Rico, and we see no issue with East Jerusalem being a commonwealth of both nations. As Jerusalem is unique, it certainly can be afforded unique status.

**Other Areas of Joint Administration**

AS THIS AREA OF THE WORLD HAS CHANGED since the late 1960s, we believe that cities such as Ariel, settlement blocs such as Gush Etzion, and large communities such as Ma’ale Adumim must be managed in ways that require mutual agreements. For example, although we believe that Ma’ale Adumim and other large communities must have access to Israel, the territories themselves need not be Israeli. And if such territories are determined to be Israeli, the access routes to those territories need not be Israeli roads. The rights of Jews in those areas and Palestinians in neighboring areas to free access and commerce are best maintained by some measure of joint administration.

The area around Ma’ale Adumim, designated by Israel as E-1, is particularly sensitive because a major transportation artery linking the northern and southern areas of Palestine will have to traverse it. Currently there is much vacant land between Ma’ale Adumim and East Jerusalem where such an artery could have ample right-of-way, and it has been apportioned to Palestine for this purpose. Israeli plans to build settlements in E-1, if implemented, would complicate matters. In the end of final status negotiations, many of those settlements may have to be abandoned.

**Jewish Settlers: Those Who Return and Those Who Remain within Palestine**

WHERE THERE IS NOT A HISTORY of Jewish settlement prior to 1948, we do not see justification for establishing contiguous land access for Israeli Jewish settlements set deep within Palestinian territory. We cannot gainsay the dedication and faith of the many Jewish settlers who believe it their biblical birthright to reside in “Judea and Samaria,” nor can we fully appreciate the predicament of settler families who will likely be displaced from their homes by a peace agreement; and for this we apologize. We expect the government of Israel, and the world community, to consider their situation compassionately and to provide them with support whether they choose to move back into Israel or remain within Palestine.
We ask that the people and the government of Israel make every effort to accommodate returning settlers with honor and respect. We would ask that housing for 100,000 settlers be constructed within Israel, apportioned among its cities and towns, with locations to meet the commuting needs of settlers who work in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and other metropolitan centers. We hope that the government of Israel, with international donors, will provide financial incentives to more than compensate the settlers who relocate.

We expect that those Jews who choose to remain within the new, contiguous Palestinian nation will abide by the laws of Palestine, and we expect that the government of Palestine will offer them dual citizenship or at least legal residency. These Jews should make every effort to live as good neighbors to the Palestinians, and in return the government and people of Palestine should make every effort to protect these settlers from revenge attacks. Jews who remain should be afforded protection under the laws of Palestine as a settled Jewish minority, much as Arab governments have provided their minorities for centuries. In addition, we expect that Palestine will guarantee their unrestricted access to Israel and respect their religious rights to worship at Jewish holy places. We would expect that these Jews will continue to lobby for their interests, and that the government of Israel will do its utmost to assure that Palestine will respect their rights.

**Arab Communities within Israel**

SIMILARLY, FOR NEW ARAB AND PALESTINIAN communities within Israel, we hope that Israel will consult the residents of these communities to consider whether certain communities would like to adopt a closer relationship with the State of Palestine. Some Arab Israelis might have compelling reasons for deepening the relationship with their brothers and sisters in Palestine. Men and women alike would desire to maintain access to family members living on the opposite side of the border. It is plausible that communities of Muslims, Christians, Druze and Jews who are separated by the border would wish to maintain brotherhood and sisterhood. Here, too, people should be offered the option of dual citizenship or residence.

**Legal Protections, Human Rights, and the International Community**

ONCE THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES have settled on a border or a preliminary border, all citizens of Israel and Palestine would benefit from the involvement of the international community. In particular, we envisage that constitutional lawyers and experts from around the world should be consulted to ensure that the rights of all citizens of Israel and Palestine are respected. We ask that the World Court, or even new judicial bodies, be considered to allow for what adjudication might be necessary to stir the hearts of people from resentment.

We have consistently found that by listening to the other, resentment can be digested and steered to a better locale. After all, each person either chooses or is put into the predicament to manage any resentment that is found rooted within him- or herself. Although these proposed borders cannot end resentment, they can bring about better opportunities for people to air their concerns. Such concerns can find footing in constitutional law; and such concerns can be penned into laws, provisos and agreements, in order for people to feel hope that their rights are represented.
The swift and timely involvement of constitutional law experts after the borders have been adopted will ensure legal protections and their consistent application to those citizens of Israel and Palestine who find themselves on the opposite side of the border. Their rights should be respected as much as anyone else’s. Without a view to discuss protections for “settler” rights, we cannot see the venture of peace moving forward as much as it could or should. No one wants to see people expelled from their homes, or forced into situations that they do not want or find intolerable.

A homogeneous society is not implausible, but it must be a homogeneity based upon people’s common humanity. Laws can be enshrined in the constitutions of Israel and Palestine to assure a homogeneous quality of peace between the citizens of Israel and Palestine, and between Arab and Jewish citizens within each nation. The guarantee of civil, human, religious, and familial rights is an important foundation for these two nations to stand side by side. As we have seen with the Arab Spring, the right to vote and other such individual rights cannot be assumed; they must be fought for.

**Conclusion**

YOU WILL FIND THROUGHOUT our maps, labeling of specific areas to give those who have not travelled to the Middle East and who are unaware of the local politics an amplified view of specific sections of border. How well can any one person represent another? It is incumbent upon the reader to decide for herself or himself whether or not the information here is indicative of reality. Nonetheless, this border we believe is reasonable, viable and useful.

After viewing the various sections of our proposed border, we would ask the reader: Does it meet the needs of both parties? Does it consider the fact that women and families would like to maintain continuous relationships with others on both sides of the border? Does it support the aspirations of young men and women to a better life? These and many other serious and important questions remain. But it is our hope that the very facilitation of a border would allow people the opportunity to begin addressing them.

We are aware that each member of society is wrapped up in integral networks of heart, love and unfortunately even sometimes hate. Yet, we don’t see an environment of continued hate in the Middle East. We know the reality that in 2011 Palestinians continue to suffer occupation and an embargoed state of living, from which Israel seems unwilling to withdraw. Yet we are not pessimistic that the time is approaching when Israel will be willing to let go. We see serious efforts by all parties to come into a state of true negotiation. We believe in their good will, and trust that they mean what they say. Even the government in Gaza labeled as a terrorist organization is moving closer to the center-right—perhaps not in policy but certainly in gestures.

No negotiation is without risk. For example, when President Richard Nixon made his overture to China in 1972, it was met with many skeptical voices. Although it is hard to imagine it today with China having become a cooperative international trading partner, at the time many Americans feared that China’s communist government would simply take advantage of American naïveté to pursue hegemonic goals. Indeed, it is never certain that the party with which one engages will maintain its fair share of relationship management. This border is not about
guaranteeing success, nor is it about believing that more terrible turns might not occur. But we believe they can be managed.

This proposed border is about making a substantial offering for people to come to the negotiating table. It is about insisting that both Palestine and Israel become ever aware that the world is watching and that the world wants them to be happy and at peace. It is about insisting that Palestine and Israel be fully knowledgeable that as world citizens we do not want our own children to suffer for their shortcomings.

What sort of world is looking at Palestine and Israel? Our world is constantly seeking to improve itself, by promoting women’s rights, supporting the rights of children, and seeking new concepts and understandings of family. Our world has its places that are intolerant and even closed-minded. But it is also seeing an Internet and mobile revolution, where young people will not tolerate old ways. The young of today do not seem to wish to march off to war, but instead seek to push forward the boundaries of peace by demanding better behavior from their elders.

More than anything, this border is about passion for life itself. Whether in Copenhagen, Rome, Cape Town or Rio de Janeiro, whatever their state of economic development, people want to believe that violence is no longer the norm for determining national or international relationships. The Middle East with the Arab Spring has emerged in a new dawn. This is a timely offering, one which will give people a chance to discuss all of their issues.

We find great cause to trust the negotiators on both sides. We further commend those who have expended their life energy to negotiation as worthy of the respect of humanity. With our proposed border as a starting-point, we hope that privately the American administration, and/or France or others, will consult each side on their reaction to this border and see if, in their role as middlemen and women, they will be capable of nudging things forward in one direction or another.
Proposed Border for Palestine and Israel: Overview in Four Sections

IN THIS MAP the border between Israel and the West Bank is divided into four sections (which are color coded), because each section has its own unique characteristics: (1) Northern West Bank; (2) North Jerusalem; (3a) Jerusalem—Eastern areas and (3b) nearby Ma’ale Adumim; and (4a) South Jerusalem and (4b) Southern West Bank. This proposal will discuss and map each section of the border in detail. We will also give brief attention to Gaza and offer proposals for its future development.
Northern West Bank

Jordan River to Budrus

The proposed border of the northern West Bank follows the 1949 Armistice Line except as otherwise noted (i.e., it follows the separation wall at Oranit and in the segment north of Budrus).

We believe the Jordan River valley should be within Palestine, for reasons of territorial contiguity and to provide natural access from Palestine to Jordan.

Israeli settlements east of the border are within the territory of Palestine. This proposal includes call-outs that outline unique arrangements that could be made for certain settlements, but any such arrangements are contingent on approval by the Palestinian Authority. Thus, some settlements could be provided with road access to Israel; a few could be brought within Israel by border adjustments; but most would have the sole option to remain as minority communities in
Palestine, whence it is hoped that many will continue their daily life in peace and security, living as good neighbors among good neighbors. Generally speaking, border modifications or road access would be considered only for settlements within 8 km of the border. Refer to the discussion of Giv’at Ze’ev (page 16) for an example of the sort of mutual agreements that might be considered.

The unique enclave of Ariel and adjacent settlements to its west are proposed to become an Autonomous Economic Zone, to be administered jointly by Israel and Palestine and with road access to Israel.

**Oranit—Elkana—Ari’el Economic Zone—Ariel**

The Citizens Proposal suggests that the municipality of Ariel (shaded pink) become an autonomous district administered by its own citizens, under Israeli law. It will be a part of the Ariel Economic Zone, an autonomous zone jointly administered by Palestine and Israel with guaranteed right of transit to and from Israel. Likewise, Palestinians will have unrestricted north–south road access through the zone from Kifl Hareth and Jama’in to Salfit and Bouruqin.

The Israeli region of Oranit and Elkana extends eastward, facilitating road access to the Ariel Economic Zone. The proposed border here largely follows the separation wall, except that it does not include within Israel the farms and fields of the Palestinian community of Azun Atme that is situated east of Oranit.
The settlements of the Modi’in bloc east of the Armistice Line are placed within Israel because they are part of the Modi’in metropolitan area. North of Modi’in Ilit the proposed border extends north-northwest until it intersects the western-most of the two armistice lines and then follows it north to Budrus. The portion of the border east of Modi’in Ilit and Kfar Rut is intended to follow the separation wall, and this particular rendering should not prejudice changes in the route of the wall resulting from court decisions, as in the case of Bil’in. South of Maccabim the border follows the eastern Armistice Line south towards Mevo Horon.

The area where both Armistice Lines protrude into Israel as far as Latrun impinges on the major Israeli highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (as well as the high-speed rail line under construction); hence for purposes of contiguity it is placed in Israeli territory, including Mevo Horon. From Mevo Horon east as far as Har Adar the proposed border follows the western line. The border around Har Adar follows the separation wall and then continues east along the armistice line to the junction of the magenta and blue lines. This marks the end of the Northern West Bank segment of the border and the start of the North Jerusalem segment.
North Jerusalem

*Giv’at Ze’ev to Beit Hanina*

The Citizens Proposal puts a particular focus on the Israeli communities in the Giv’on Bloc because uniquely as settlements they are situated between Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Ramallah, but they are sufficiently far enough from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to be considered contiguous to Ramallah. The Giv’on Bloc and the separation barriers erected around it divide Palestinian communities southwest of Ramallah and obstruct the development of a central city, Ramallah. With most of this area apportioned to Palestine and the removal of separation barriers, there will be improved community interaction, and people will get on with daily living. However, without assurances of access to Israel, we cannot see that peace can be substantial. To relocate 30,000 people is hardly reasonable. Our borders seek to be reasonable and fair.
The Citizens Proposal asks that Palestine and Israel negotiate the terms of a 99-year lease for Giv’at Ze’ev, Mahane Giv’on and Har Shmu’el, including road access along Rte 436 (Sderot Golda Meir), after which time these settlements will be absorbed into Palestine. As a concession, Israel will abandon Giv’on HaHadasha, because the new settlement is not well thought out and impinges on the houses in Bayt Ijza. It is hoped that this sort of agreement—a concession in return for leases of a fixed term, might be a precedent for discussing other settlements, each in a unique way, and thus provide a future for the Jews in those settlements.

The settlements of Agan HaAyalot and Beit Horon (which do not currently front on Rte 436) might ask as well for negotiated leases of shorter time periods in return for concessions to Palestine, whereby they might continue to have a temporary settlement presence even while they begin relocation.

We propose that Nebi Shmu’el (Nabi Samuil) become an international religious site, managed by either party according to the outcome of negotiations. Bayt Iksa is included within Israel, with road access to Jerusalem via Rte 436.

Rte 436 north of the Shmu’el Junction and Rte 404 from Beit Hanina (west) would become Palestinian roads to serve the needs of the growing Ramallah metropolitan area.

The western end of this segment of border meets the armistice line north of Mevaseret Zion. The route of proposed border will allow the high speed train between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem currently under construction to run entirely within the territory of Israel.

On its eastern side, the proposed northern border of Jerusalem extends no further north than the northern limits of Beit Hanina, just south of the al-Ram Refugee Camp. The areas north of this line that are currently part of the Jerusalem municipality may be allocated to Palestine: the Jerusalem Airport, the ‘Atarot Industrial Zone and the Palestinian village of Kafr ‘Aqab. In our view, these areas properly belong to the municipality of Ramallah.

**Detail: Beit Hanina / Dahiyat El-Barid**
We drew the proposed border to minimize disruption to neighborhoods north and north-west of Beit Hanina.

**Beit Hanina to Shuafat**

![Map of Israel and Palestine showing the border between Beit Hanina and Shuafat](image)

We call the feature on the northeast corner above Pisgat Ze’ev and east of Neve Ya’akov “God’s Thumb”; it signifies what we believe is the divine inspiration behind this proposed border. It expresses poignantly God’s attitude: He is fed up with the lack of peace among His children, as any parent would be. God wants action; therefore, He inspired a “line of demarcation” as a reference point for humanity on earth and in heaven, a starting point as they lobby for their Israeli or Palestinian interests. The Citizens Proposal retains this feature of the line of demarcation—God’s signature, so to speak—as an endorsement of this border and efforts to make it a reality. It is envisioned that the unoccupied area within the Thumb can become a peace park in the future.

From the Thumb to Shuafat, the proposed border follows the separation wall except in the Anata forest, where it apportions half of this parkland to the Palestinians of Anata.
Shuafat Refugee Camp
The entrance to the Shuafat Refugee Camp, pictured below, marks the eastern terminus of the North Jerusalem section of the proposed border and the northern terminus of the East Jerusalem section (turquoise line).
Jerusalem—Eastern Areas of Focus

NO PEACE AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE without resolving the issue of East Jerusalem. Our proposed border is put together in sections for the purpose of simplifying some of the many complicated issues for the Northern West Bank and Southern West Bank, and we have suggested parameters for managing the issue of settlements. All this is to enable the negotiations to focus on East Jerusalem. Therefore, rather than attempting to draw a firm and fixed border for the eastern areas of Jerusalem, we have identified the eastern edge of what can be regarded as the Greater Jerusalem Metropolitan Area, and invite the representatives of Palestine and Israel to negotiate the disposition and management of this area.

Our experience in Israel and Palestine is that generally people want to be able to move freely without restriction. The borders around Jerusalem, whatever they might be, jut into the very heart of Palestine. Those borders need to be managed with an eye toward what would make life easier for women and children, which means agreeing on an approach that focuses on allowing people to move easily.

New trolleys and train routes in Jerusalem are indicative of the desire of many in Jerusalem to have one community. If that is the case, then roads and services in Arab areas of the city must be improved to equal the standards of West Jerusalem. This will occur as the spirit of generosity grows and, once the border is fixed, resources are freed up to improve housing and infrastructure.

The area shaded in yellow we believe could live at peace in either state, and we ask the Israeli Knesset and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate whether all or part of this area will (1) be within Jerusalem, (2) constitute a separate Palestinian city of East Jerusalem, or (3) constitute an area of Jerusalem under joint administration. If a zone of joint Palestinian–Israeli administration is set up for the Arab neighborhoods and towns of East Jerusalem within a united city, other Arab communities not shaded yellow but contiguous to it, such as those on the Mount of Olives, Wadi al-Joz and Shaykh Jarah, could be added to the zone.

The area shaded blue signifies those areas east of the Armistice Line that we believe should remain within Jerusalem in the event that all or part of the yellow-shaded areas are divided off into a separate Palestinian city. It is an area populated by Jews and/or essential to the geographic contiguity of Jerusalem.

We believe that Israel will consider good-faith requests for Arab East Jerusalem. Borders may not be required in the form of fencing or walls but instead may be administrative. We believe the environment will allow for a reduction of check-points and that check-points may be relocated to specified borders or border locations.

The peace of Jerusalem will not be secure without continual cooperation between Israel and Palestine. We ask the Knesset and the Palestinian Authority to put down their disagreements and conference regularly on the management of Jerusalem.
We deliberately did not assign ownership of the Old City because we believe that access to the holy sites should be open to Israelis and Palestinians alike. The Damascus Gate is not shaded blue, indicative of our desire that Palestinians have unrestricted access through that route, just as Jews have unrestricted access through the Jaffa Gate.

The Mount of Olives is shaded blue out of respect for Christians, for whom the experience of retracing the route of Jesus’ Passion from the Garden of Gethsemane to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre should not require passing through a border, as well as out of respect for the large

*See discussion of Ma’ale Adumim, below.
Jewish cemetery on its slopes. But we did not shade the Muslim Yuseifa cemetery that runs along the eastern wall of the Old City, to preserve Palestinian access. We assigned to Israel its archeological patrimony in the City of David, which Israelis view as their cultural heritage.

Concerning Christian holy sites, we would ask that the Papal See, authorities of the Orthodox churches, and the World Council of Churches be consulted.
Ma’ale Adumim

THE CITIZENS PROPOSAL HAS DELIBERATELY PUSHED the borders of Jerusalem to the doors of Ma’ale Adumim to force a meaningful solution for that community. Yet we have held back from including it territorially within the State of Israel, because to do so would in effect divide the West Bank in half. We believe that Palestine must have contiguity north and south such that effective transportation links, highways and trains running between Ramallah and Bethlehem to Hebron can be constructed. Palestine should not be encumbered with a narrow neck of land at its mid-section, any more than Israel.

At present in 2011, the extent of the Ma’ale Adumim bloc is large, and growth within it is limited and controlled. Without an effective and timely resolution, this enclave or would-be enclave could easily become a full extension of Israel. This is neither right nor wrong. But one thing is clear: morally the growth and/or disposition of Ma’ale Adumim should be managed by mutual agreement between the two peoples. It is our position that if Palestinians do not support the community to expand, then that must be respected.

That said, we would not attempt to define for Israel or Palestine what “respect” means in this case. Rather, we would insist that they work for mutual understanding. The world is full of enemies who have become friends as well as friends who later became enemies. People can only do their best, and our observation in 2011 is that representatives of both Palestine and Israel are attempting to do their best. We believe that when Palestinians and Israelis resolve the issue of access for Ma’ale Adumim and consider the needs of those who live there, all things will fall into place for Arab East Jerusalem because respect will have been demonstrated.

Palestine can offer respect to the Jewish residents of Ma’ale Adumim by maintaining their access to Jerusalem and by enacting special laws to protect their rights to own, buy and sell property to whomever they wish, whether Jew or Arab. We anticipate that many of Ma’ale Adumim’s 30,000-plus Jewish residents will continue to live there with these legal protections, even as they are offered Palestinian citizenship and may take dual citizenship. We believe that Palestine will respect the rights of the residents of Ma’ale Adumim to their cultural and religious traditions. We expect that those Palestinians who might purchase property in Ma’ale Adumim will live in peace with their Jewish neighbors, and those Jews who live in Ma’ale Adumim will live in peace with Arabs who might move into their neighborhoods. There should be no restrictions on who can purchase property and live in this zone. Palestine may even choose to offer respect by granting the residents of Ma’ale Adumim self-government as an autonomous zone within Palestine.

E-1 and a North-South Palestinian Highway

The area that Israel has designated as E-1 lies mostly within the Ma’ale Adumim Zone, with the above-mentioned guarantee of property rights for Israeli residents. This would mitigate the diplomatic issues around Israel’s decision (December 2012) to plan new residential construction in E-1, as long as those plans are on land east of the north-south line that bisects E-1 and marks
the western border of the Zone. However, land west of that line will necessarily be part of Palestine; hence Israeli construction there would be problematic.

We have proposed a route for a North-South highway linking Ramallah with Bethlehem that passes mostly through a corridor of land designated for Palestine between Jerusalem and the Ma’ale Adumim Zone. Fairness requires that the existing provision of East-West access from Ma’ale Adumim and Jerusalem via Route 1 be balanced with a route for Palestinians traveling from Ramallah in the northern West Bank to Bethlehem and Hebron in the southern West Bank and that will also allow ready access to East Jerusalem. Although this proposal only connects with local roads, we can presume that the State of Palestine will want to build a modern highway system utilizing this link. At the southern end of the route, the north-south highway meets the “hinge of Jerusalem,” where the borders of Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim meet. There we have indicated several roading options--either crossing the Ma’ale Adumim Zone or skirting around it. Thus the “hinge,” which was set up to establish contiguity and access for Israelis between
Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, is also a Palestinian point of access between the northern and southern West Bank.

**The “Hinge of Jerusalem”**

The “hinge of Jerusalem” is all about access, Jewish access to and from Ma’ale Adumim, and Palestinian access between the northern and southern West Bank. Its purpose is to allow for and help the negotiating parties to take ample consideration of Ma’ale Adumim’s unique status and requirements. It is called a “hinge” because it is where four lines converge: 1) the proposed border; 2) the separation wall; 3) the boundary of the Ma’ale Adumim zone where residents will have special property rights; and 4) the line of demarcation that was drawn at the beginning of our process of developing this proposal.

If, through negotiations, Eizariya or other areas shaded yellow become part of Palestine, the status of the hinge, as well as options for the route between Ma’ale Adumim and Jerusalem, may change.
South Jerusalem

THE CHARACTER OF THE BORDER of the eastern areas of Jerusalem is unique, because it invites and requires extensive negotiation between the two parties. Hence, we have left many issues open for wide-ranging discussion. However, once we move on to the South Jerusalem border—the first part of the segment that extends from South Jerusalem to the Dead Sea—we have a section of border where in most locales there may be clear view toward a mutual agreement.

**Jabal Mukabbir and East Talpiyyot**
We propose that Palestine’s border can extend to the Armistice Line at the Peace Forest and include Jabal Mukabbir.

Residents of Jabal Mukkabir living in said area northwest of a designated line, as shown on the above map, depending on the outcome of negotiations about East Jerusalem, may wish to hold a referendum to determine if they will become part of Israel or Palestine.

The settlement of Nof Zion obstructs the narrow neck of this area. We drew the border to keep it in Israel, but it will need a new access road to the northeast.

The juncture of the East Jerusalem segment of the border and the South Jerusalem segment of the border is a point due south of the intersection of the unnamed north-south street just east of Abu Tor Street in Abu Tor, the 1949 Armistice Line, and the footpath into the Peace Forest.
Considering that Beit Safafa is a natural suburb of Bethlehem, we propose giving it wide access to neighboring Palestinian towns, including Bait Jala and Umm Tuba. Giv’at HaMatos is largely empty at this time, and we believe that land could be used to develop Beit Safafa’s infrastructure of access. This will also require new access roads or causeways to Gilo and Har Homa, as Dov Yosef becomes a street in Beit Safafa. A new intersection at the entrance of Har Homa with underpasses and overpasses should allow for separate routes for Palestinian and Israeli traffic.

While we are reluctant to assign Beit Safafa to Jerusalem, we include an alternative border which signifies that outcome.
Regardless, we believe the border should be managed by women who bring feminine values to make for comfortable and smooth crossings and to accommodate the large daily flow of traffic between Jerusalem to Bethlehem. We refer to this South Jerusalem border as the “Women’s Border,” because it is envisaged that committees of women from both Israel and Palestine might be established, to be consulted about the arrangements for border crossings and continually involved in their management. The close proximity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem necessitates a continually managed environment, where the needs of and conveniences for women and families have a high priority amidst other priorities. These needs will not be neglected if women are regularly consulted.

The Women’s Border stretches from the start of the South Jerusalem section to a juncture marked north of al-Walaja, and then extends further to a juncture marked just north of Batir. The extension from al-Walaja to Batir requires more formidable care, for here there has been a history of frustration, and womanly intervention is anticipated to promote reconciliation. We call on the women of Israel and Palestine to work to facilitate this.

It is hoped that in the future, as Jerusalem and Bethlehem and their environs expand toward the border, there will have been placed sufficient focus by both nations to assure peace. It is hoped that this Women’s Border will become a Peace Border, a border of reconciliation, and that it might also become a model for how to promote a peaceful border between Israel and her northern neighbors.
The section of border that began at South Jerusalem continues through the Southern West Bank to the Dead Sea. Southwest of Gilo the border follows the Armistice Line until the Etzion Bloc, which is depicted in the detail map below. From where the separation wall meets the Armistice Line south of Rte 367 and above al-Dayr, the border follows the separation wall south all the way to Metsadot Yehuda; then it continues along the Armistice Line to the Dead Sea. The only exception is the settlement of Eshkolot, which is not included in Israel.

Where, due to meanderings of the separation wall, pockets of people find themselves east of the Armistice Line but west of the border, they may negotiate for a referendum to be held—
contingent upon the two states agreeing to terms and perimeters—to determine for themselves whether their community will be in Israel or Palestine.

Aside from the Etzion Bloc and those along the border in the far south (Sansana, Metzadot Yehuda), this proposal places all the settlements in the southern West Bank within Palestine. Those settlers and communities who are determined to remain may find their future as a Jewish minority within Palestine, and it is our hope that they will find welcome, safety, and the opportunity to build lasting relationships with their Palestinian neighbors.

**Etzion Bloc (Gush Etzion)**

Gush Etzion has a history of Jewish settlement dating back to the 1920s, and is an area in the West Bank with a Jewish majority. Our proposal for a Gush Etzion enclave is indicative of the existent reality that is there. It does not purport that those who live there are justified, but it does
purport that those who live there believe they are justified. It is neither here nor there to argue which is true. But it is an imperative to accept that those who live in the Etzion Bloc must be cared for.

However, the Etzion Bloc impinges on Route 60, the central artery for the southern West Bank connecting Bethlehem and Hebron. The requirement for a contiguous Palestinian state would render an Israeli enclave here untenable unless extensive new road building is constructed. In particular, a new Rte 60A bypass road will be needed to enable Palestinian traffic between Bethlehem and Hebron to flow freely entirely within Palestine. Until that is built, Palestinians and Israelis must have reciprocal rights to travel Rte 60 through Gush Etzion and to and from Jerusalem. We also believe it is important to provide services, especially emergency services, for Palestinian travelers within Israeli territory. Hence we propose a first aid facility, petrol station and convenience store along Rte 60 near Neve Daniel. It can also include a place for prayers. At the same time, new roads will be needed to connect Gush Etzion with Israel. We propose two roads, one over a strip of land at Giva’ot Junction, and the other to Beitar Ilit and connecting with Rte 375 west to Tsur Hadasa. At the same time, there should be road access for Palestinians traveling between the local villages of Husan, Nahalin and Jaba.

What’s fair is fair, and in providing consideration for the settlements in the Etzion Bloc, we would also offer consideration to Wadi Fukin, an Arab agricultural community lying between the Armistice Line and Beitar Ilit. We would provide it with broad land access to the north at the strip of land labeled (1). However, this strip of land is also the path of Rte 375, the main access in and out of Beitar Ilit. Therefore, while it will remain in Israeli hands for a time, it will revert to Palestine once new roads are built out of Beitar Ilit to the south that connect with the new Ezion Bloc access road through Giva’ot Junction. In any case, it will revert to Palestine on the fourth anniversary of the signing of the agreement that establishes this border.

**Dead Sea**

We propose, to promote good will and international peace, that a Jewish university be placed in Palestine on the shores of the Dead Sea, preferably south of Ovnat, within easy driving access to Jerusalem. The university will have faculties in economics and business, religious study, and the advancement of agriculture in arid areas.
We would like the world community to conceive of a new environment in Gaza similar to Dubai, and to use the wealth of oil to finance the development of a modern port. We would like Gaza to be offered rail access to the Gulf of Aqaba, whereby freight shipped to the port in Gaza could then be transshipped to the Gulf of Aqaba by rail. We would also like Gaza to be offered a rail corridor to the West Bank for freight and passengers.

In this way, Palestinians can have access by rail to come in and out of Gaza. They should also be given access to travel via an international airport in the West Bank. We would ask that at the conclusion of any agreed border, the two nations would meet again in 10 to 20 years, if not before, to establish meaningful automobile and vehicular routes across the region.
Let Us Prepare for Two States

Generally, when a new device is created, the people who create it have a reasonably clear vision about what they are creating and how it will function to fulfill its purpose. They know the context in which it will be used, and they have some degree of confidence that it will function as planned to be useful. Therefore, they can make preparations for their device, both internally for its efficient manufacture and externally to market it to its users.

This also applies to the creation of a state. Those who build successful states spend years making preparations before their vision of a state is realized. The Jews who created the State of Israel in the period 1945-1948 had a vision for a Jewish homeland a sovereign state. They made preparations, even under the adverse circumstances of the British occupation. These preparations, in the areas of military, infrastructure, diplomacy and governance, greatly assisted in the birth of Israel. The same is true for the Palestinian Authority in this current period, with the work of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad to build national institutions and a functioning economy within the West Bank even under Israeli occupation. Even now, when the Palestinian Authority is planning a bid for recognition as a state in the United Nations, these preparations are greatly aiding their cause.

However, what we are seeking to create in the Middle East in 2011 is not just one new state of Palestine. Rather, it is a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine co-existing side-by-side and at peace. So what is actually being created is not just one state, but also a new arrangement between two states. Consider:

- A new state can be created by the unilateral action of its government and its citizens, but in this situation unilateral action is not possible. Hence, even with its campaign for UN recognition, the government of the Palestinians is committed to becoming a full-fledged state through negotiations with Israel. It understands that only through a mutual agreement covering all areas of concern will Israel willingly relinquish sovereignty over the territory of the Palestinian state.

- Geographical considerations place these two peoples in close proximity, requiring cooperative management of certain key areas of their border. The Citizens Proposal envisions specific areas of cooperative management, for instance in the city of Ariel, and most especially in and around Jerusalem. Absent such cooperative management, a solution for Jerusalem becomes quite problematic. Having a hostile border running through the city of Jerusalem would be neither acceptable nor wise policy.

- Israel and Palestine have intersecting security needs, which have already led to cooperative arrangements between the IDF and Palestinian security forces. Cooperation on security at even deeper levels will be vital to securing Israel’s agreement for a Palestinian state.
Whether or not Israel would agree to a peace agreement depends considerably on solving the issue of Israeli settlements, and yet the fate of Israeli settlers who wind up within Palestine as the result of such an agreement is at this point completely uncertain. Expectation that those settlers will be required to remove themselves to Israel places a high barrier in the way of an agreement, while provision for their rights and protections as a minority within Palestine would ease the way to an agreement. If Israel and Palestine were to develop parameters and to accommodate the needs of settlers who wish to stay and to ensure their safety, it would improve the prospects for an agreement that would establish a Palestinian state.

For these reasons and more, it is helpful to conceive of the establishment of the Palestinian State as a Two-State Solution that requires the cooperative investment of both sides. The kind of preparation that is needed to bring these two states to birth cannot be done by Palestinians alone. As much as Palestinians are putting effort into building the institutions of their nascent state, effort needs to be put into preparing for cooperative Israeli-Palestinian management of sensitive areas like Jerusalem. It is not too early to begin discussions towards the establishment of policies, laws and institutions of cooperative governance.

**Jerusalem and Joint Governance**

As mentioned, having a hostile border running through the city of Jerusalem would be neither acceptable nor wise policy. History demonstrates that divided cities are breeding grounds for conflict. That is why, as its default position, the Citizens Proposal places the entire city of Jerusalem, including its eastern environs, under Israeli sovereignty. Nevertheless, there are other options for Jerusalem that could be considered based upon the establishment of a zone of joint administration for designated areas of East Jerusalem.

If the Israelis and Palestinians could prepare for bilateral institutions to manage a jointly-administered East Jerusalem, then it could indeed be possible for East Jerusalem to be the seat of Palestinian governance even while it is still part of Israeli-governed metropolitan Jerusalem.

Moreover, in any scenario, the borders around Jerusalem need to be able to sustain a considerable flow of traffic. This includes:

- Jews commuting from Ma’ale Adumim and other residential settlements in the Jerusalem vicinity that may become part of Palestine or become enclaves separated from Jerusalem by Palestinian territory;
- Palestinians commuting to work in Jerusalem, visiting relatives and friends in East Jerusalem, or wishing to worship at the al-Aqsa Mosque;
- Tourists traveling between Jerusalem and the biblical sites of Bethlehem, Jericho, the Jordan River and Qumran that may be located within Palestine; and
- Palestinians journeying north-south between Ramallah and Bethlehem and Jews journeying between Jerusalem and Gush Etzion on roads which may pass through the other nation’s territory near Jerusalem.
For this reason, attention needs to be paid to the issues of managing the borders and roads around Jerusalem. Preparations should be made for their joint administration by a bilateral authority to be constituted by the governments of both states.

It goes without saying that a low-conflict border in and around Jerusalem will require intensified efforts to assure peace and security and to prevent terrorism. The border cannot become so porous as to allow those bent on destruction to enter Israel. What measures could permit the unimpeded flow of traffic without compromising security? How could Israel and Palestine maintain security without creating excessive bottlenecks for travelers? Part of the solution will be expanded cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces to identify and apprehend terrorists, to prevent terroristic acts, and to provide adequate forms of justice.

**Envisioning Cooperative Management of the Border**

Preparation for cooperative management at the border near Jerusalem begins with asking the people of Israel and Palestine the question: what sort of border would you like to see? Some Israelis might favor a closed border similar to what exists today, while many Palestinians might prefer an open border. A discussion needs to happen between Israelis and Palestinians to try and arrive at a mutually agreed upon vision for a border.

Data should be collected on the reality of cross-border traffic between the Palestinian territories and Israel at check-points around Jerusalem, to ascertain: average daily and peak traffic flows, purpose of travel (specifically social/non-economic or economic), type and weight of goods being transported, average travel time to the checkpoint, average waiting time to get through, and incidence and location of security problems. Discussants should ascertain whether this reality is acceptable, and what would be acceptable targets to reduce travel and waiting times, improve security, and so on.

Among these targets should be fast crossings for family purposes, especially if families have children studying in, or residing part-time, in the neighbor state. Since we anticipate that some settled Jews would remain in Palestine, this traffic could easily include both Jewish and Arab families. With diligent policing, secure passes could be set up for daily commuters and frequent travelers on bus and rail lines. Additional check-points could be created, additional personnel trained and hired, and procedures at those checkpoints modified so as to reach these targets.

Here is where cooperative management comes in. Currently the protocols at the border are entirely dictated by Israel according to how it sees the situation, while Palestinians are made to suffer many indignities. The best way to change that situation is to manage the borders by a joint authority that has a mandate to address the needs of Palestinians and Israelis alike.

The Palestinian members of the joint authority would work to make the border crossing a pleasant and speedy experience for Palestinians, even as the Israeli members work to assure security. Furthermore, cooperative police work will enhance security.

Germane to this discussion would be to survey representative examples of existing borders that try to balance the needs of unimpeded traffic with border security:
• The borders of the EU established by the Schengen Treaty exemplify a completely open border where security is handled jointly by cooperative agreements and shared intelligence among the police, military and intelligence agencies of the nations of Europe. It is hard to remember today that Europe was the theater of two world wars. Yet the precedent of the NATO alliance makes this option entirely acceptable to broad majorities of Europeans.

• The border between Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and El Paso, Texas is divided only by the narrow Rio Grande and a couple of border checkpoints. Nevertheless, Ciudad Juarez is a hotbed of drug-related violence while El Paso remains one of the safest cities in the United States. Crossing the border is easy, and the only thing that has reduced the steady back and forth of trade and family visits has been the violence on the Mexican side. Because these border crossings are well manned by US Border Patrol agents who work to spot illegal immigrants and drug smugglers, most of the illegal activity on the US-Mexican border occurs in remote rural areas where smugglers try to circumvent the separation barrier. However, US-Mexican cooperation is spotty due to widespread corruption in the Mexican police.

• Provisions for airport security in the United States utilize new technology and strict screening procedures to identify contraband and weapons, yet with minimal inconvenience or impediments to travelers. These security efforts are supported by cooperative intelligence efforts by Interpol and the agencies of many nations to identify terrorist threats to air travel before they even arrive at the airport.

The immediate task would be to improve the existing system with the hope that future trust will emerge to permit more open borders. What policies for managing traffic flow could be adopted from the procedures used at checkpoints at the US-Mexican border? What lessons can be learned from the protocols at busy airports, where the convenience of the traveler is an important factor that must be balanced against security needs? Are there ways that security cooperation between Israel and Palestine in matters relating to anti-terrorism work could be expanded to also facilitate border traffic? Are there technologies for facilitating secure and rapid border traffic that could be implemented, for example a shared database of known risks, a database of commuters and travelers who are cleared of any security risk, or fingerprint scanning technology for improved identification?

Designing the Border

Nations normally invest to make their points of entry attractive to visitors—viz. the investment in the new Ben Gurion Airport. A beautiful airport demonstrates a nation’s pride and offers a welcoming experience to help travelers think well of that nation. In the same way, it would be a show of respect to Palestinians and other visitors who enter Israel through border crossings if they were also architecturally attractive and pleasant places. Effort should be made to create architecturally well designed checkpoints with abundant landscaping. The trash and litter that blights the current checkpoints should be cleared away. Interiors should be attractively furnished,
with sufficient seating for the elderly, infirm, and pregnant, play areas for children, dressing and diaper-changing areas, and food concessions.

Since these amenities would be on both sides of the checkpoint, the responsibility for designing and building them would naturally fall to the joint administrative authority.

In the Citizens Proposal, we have termed the southern border of Jerusalem the “women’s border,” because this area has some of the heaviest cross-border traffic, particularly between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. It is from a woman’s perspective that we advocate for designing an attractive environment and providing for amenities at border crossings. Women are sensitive to the needs of women and families who regularly cross the border. They will advocate for procedures that are respectful and not demeaning; compassionate and not dehumanizing. They are aware of many situations where people need to travel across the border and would want to handle with sympathy whatever problems might arise. It is for this reason that we believe that women should play a prominent role in the joint administration of the borders of Jerusalem.

Another area of design concerns roads, with their intersections, underpasses, bridges and tunnels that will enable traffic of one nation to pass through short stretches of the other nation’s territory as required by the geography. While currently Israel can unilaterally design and construct roads through Palestinian territory according to its master plans, these plans may be seen as disadvantaging Palestinians and not providing equitably for their transportation needs. Roads that facilitate Israeli travel to and from settlements are not normally matched by roads that facilitate Palestinian travel between its major cities. Sometimes these Israeli roads even sever traditional links between nearby towns.\(^5\)

It is inevitable that some degree of joint administration will be required for roads which traverse the territory of the neighboring state. According to the Citizens Proposal some of these could include:

- A north-south highway between Ramallah and Bethlehem, skirting East Jerusalem, which may either run through Ma’ale Adumim or cross Rte 1 between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim;
- A road crossing for the Israeli route from Jerusalem to Har Homa and the Palestinian Rte 398 from Beit Safafa to Umm Tuba
- Rte 436 north of Palestine’s border with northern Jerusalem to the leased settlements of Giv’at Ze’ev, Mahane Giv’on and Har Shmu’el.
- A highway in Palestine from Bethlehem to Hebron rerouted to avoid the Gush Etzion area;
- Palestinian access to Rte 60 within the Gush Etzion area for travel between Bethlehem and Hebron until that highway is built;
- Roads from the Gush Etzion settlements to Israel that cross the roads connecting Palestinian towns in the region;
- The stretch of Highway 5 (and Rte 505) from Elkana to the Ariel Joint Economic Zone that passes through Palestine;

\(^5\) For example, between the two parts of Beit Hanina.
• Access to Palestine for residents of Azun Atme via the portion of Rte 505 that runs within Israel as far as Elkana

The administrative and construction issues in these roads are too many and varied to all be dealt with in a peace agreement. They will require the efforts of engineers to deal with topography and urban planners to envision the future shape of metropolitan growth for cities like Ramallah. Therefore, they are best solved by a joint administrative roads authority that will be charged with creating a master plan for Israeli and Palestinian roads and highways that gives equal consideration to both nations.

Conclusion
In any activity, good preparation is a key to success. When it comes to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the preparation that is required cannot be limited to the efforts of Palestinians to create the institutions of their state, or of the Israelis to plan for their future security in the environment where Palestine exists as their neighbor. Thought also needs to be given to preparing for the joint administration of sensitive areas. This is especially true of Jerusalem and its borders, where Israelis and Palestinians are so closely intertwined. We anticipate the creation of bilateral institutions for the administration of East Jerusalem as a shared sovereignty: a Palestinian-governed city within Israeli-run metropolitan Jerusalem. We anticipate bilateral institutions to manage border crossings and road construction.

Preparing for these bilateral institutions now—soliciting Israeli and Palestinian buy-in, forming preparatory committees of Israelis and Palestinians, and having them create statements of shared principles for how these institutions should operate—will go a long way to reducing the fear and uncertainty that people face when contemplating the implementation of two-state solution. For when people see that adequate preparation has been made, they can be more confident to go forward.
Position Statements

Since the publication of this Citizens Proposal, we continue to look at subsequent developments which may or may not impinge on the proposed border. When governments take actions contrary to the border, we must take notice. Nevertheless, we are looking for good will from the government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and ordinary Israeli and Palestinian citizens. It is time, we believe, when everyone should call a halt to the ways of confrontation and instead test the waters of peace.

We would appreciate your feedback.
Har Homa C

August 9, 2011

The Israeli government’s reported approval of a permit to construct 930 apartments in land designated as Har Homa C is contrary to the Citizens Proposal for a Border between Israel and Palestine, both in substance and in spirit. It is contrary to the substance of the proposal, because the allocated land is on the Palestinian side of the proposed border. It is contrary to the spirit of the proposal, which envisioned its proposed border by a process that sought to accommodate the needs of both parties fairly. Clearly in this case the Israeli government acted unilaterally, without consulting its Palestinian counterpart.

We understand that even though peace is a central desire of all citizens of the Middle East, people differ as to the form that peace might take. While we are disappointed in the decision made to authorize settlement building in Har Homa C, we also see that the issue can further be discussed between parties, and we ask each party to find the most constructive form of dialog.

Because we believe that the Citizen’s Proposal, on its merits, could become widely regarded as a basis for negotiating a final settlement, we see the possibility that Har Homa C will end up falling within the territory of Palestine. Therefore, we would ask Israel to ensure that its citizens know that they have no guarantee, if they settle in Har Homa C, that they will be able to continue through the generations as citizens of Israel. Those Jews who settle there must take ownership of their choice, which could very likely place them and their families within Palestine.

We wish to be fair to all sides. At a time when we believe that all sides should be making effort to secure a peaceful border between Palestine and Israel, Har Homa C sticks out like a sore

thumb. Our border proposal includes a thumb-shaped area northeast of Pisgat Ze’ev designated as an international peace park. It is an offering to include the Divine.

We hope that those who are working for peace will stay on task and not be distracted by recriminations over this news. Instead, we would promote true fellowship between the people of Israel and Palestine, as this is vital for peace. Har Homa C falls in the area we have termed “the women’s border.” We hope that Palestinian and Israeli women will assist in navigating the best outcome, so that whatever results, the children yet to be born who will live there can stand proudly on a legacy of peace.

We respect the citizens of Israel and Palestine who may be disappointed by this news, and as world citizens we too are disappointed, and saddened. Yet sadness can be a powerful driver, which we hope will motivate renewed calls for action, particularly among the women of Israel and Palestine who live near this part of the border. It is a densely populated area where there is a history of managing various ethnicities. We believe that better solutions can be found on the strength of the involvement of women.

For those outside of Israel and Palestine, we ask that women in Egypt signal, not only their sentiment, but also their commitment to finding meaningful border solutions. Their involvement will be vital for improving the situation of Gaza vis-à-vis Egypt in this ever-changing world.

If Har Homa C is built, we hope that it will become a place where any citizen of the Middle East may dwell in safety and security.
Since the beginning of August, the media have reported several Israeli proposals for new housing construction in disputed areas of Jerusalem. An August 8 press report of 4,300 new housing units lists slated for development in “occupied East Jerusalem” was quickly followed by news of planned construction at Har Homa, Gilo, Ramat Shlomo, and Pisgat Ze’ev. If the Citizens Proposal is any guide, some of these construction projects are likely to fall within Israeli territory as part of a mutually agreed settlement, but not necessarily all of them. Only a mutually agreed upon border between Israel and Palestine will still the voices of protest over new construction projects, because then both sides will know clearly on which side of the border they sit.

In a dramatic new development, Israel announced on October 14 that the planning process for 2,160 new housing units in Giv’at HaMatos has been completed. The significance of this obstacle to arriving at a negotiated settlement deserves serious attention by the diplomatic community. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has condemned the proposal as “unacceptable,” EU spokesperson Catherine Ashton contends that “these initiatives run contrary to the current EU and Quartet efforts to bring about the resumption of peace negotiations,” and chief PLO negotiator Saeb Erekat announced that “Israel’s plan to build 2,610 housing units… between Bethlehem and Jerusalem makes a mockery of efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace.” We agree. Such unilateral moves are counter-productive and only delay the resumption of serious talks to settle on a border.

Although it is only a few hundred meters from West Jerusalem, Gilo, and Har Homa, the salient geographic fact about Giv’at HaMatos is that its construction would directly obstruct the entrance to the Palestinian town of Beit Safafa, completely isolating it. Geographically speaking Beit Safafa is a suburb of Bethlehem, but the construction of Giv’at HaMatos would strangle its relationship with its urban hub, as well as with neighboring Beit Jala. This plan hems in Beit Safafa on every side, making it a near-island surrounded by Gilo to the south and west, Jerusalem to the north, and with its eastern perimeter blocked by Giv’at HaMatos. There are few

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proposed settlements that would be such a direct affront to an adjacent Palestinian community as Giv’at HaMatos would be to Beit Safafa.

Currently, Giv’at HaMatos is largely vacant land. In the 1980s it was the site of a trailer park, containing temporary homes for Ethiopian refugees. The trailers are largely gone, leaving behind a hardscrabble hill. It is permitted for construction, but significant construction has not yet begun. This means that placing Giv’at HaMatos within Palestine will not displace an appreciable number of Israelis. The border in the Citizens Proposal is drawn to place Beit Safafa under Palestinian sovereignty. We envision that a Palestinian Giv’at HaMatos will provide room for Beit Safafa’s natural growth and give that community broad access to its urban hub in Bethlehem.

The Israeli developers who plan to build these housing units in Giv’at HaMatos may have gone to considerable expense to gain legal title to the land, divide it into parcels, and obtain the necessary construction permits; in some cases they may have purchased land from former Palestinian owners. A negotiated agreement could include a fund to reimburse private interests for loss of such lands. There will no doubt be many similar claims made by Palestinians for loss of their private land that is allocated to Israel, and they too will deserve compensation from such a fund.

This proposed housing is within the area that the Citizens Proposal has designated the “women’s border.” The women’s border should be a place where, by the efforts of women peace-builders, Palestinians and Israelis find consensus through discussion and by forming bonds of love and mutual respect. We have been informed by Israeli women that there is already a considerable reservoir of goodwill between the inhabitants of Beit Safafa and nearby Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Pat. However, this goodwill is likely to evaporate if Giv’at HaMatos is built up as an Israeli settlement and Beit Safafa finds itself surrounded on all sides. For the people of Beit Safafa, it would no doubt create anger and animosity towards Israel that would last for a long time to come, even after the peace agreement is signed.

This thorn in the lives of the people of East Jerusalem, especially of Beit Safafa, could become a permanent irritant and point of frustration. Considering the importance of ties between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and the large volume of travel between them, including Christian tourists who wish to visit the holy sites in both cities, creating this irritant to the people who live along that border is surely counterproductive. It will become a cause for greater confrontation and even increase the potential for violence for decades to come.

The residents of Beit Safafa should feel empowered to work out their relationship with Jerusalem without coercion. There is even the possibility that the people of Beit Safafa, if they are polled as to whether they wish to be part of Israel or Palestine, might choose to remain in Israel.

Given these “facts on the ground,” the Palestinians who deserve the right to be a party in adjudicating the future of Beit Safafa also need to be a party to negotiating the future of Giv’at HaMatos. The future of this parcel of land, more than any other settlement in the Jerusalem area, needs to be determined by negotiations. Israel’s unilateral action, therefore, deserves to be vigorously opposed by the international community. We hope that no Israeli will move into Giv’at HaMatos until its future is negotiated as part of an agreed settlement.
The Question of Recognizing Israel as a Jewish State

September 10, 2011

In recent months, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has demanded that the Palestinians agree to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” as a precondition for peace talks. Yet Palestinians have indicated that they would have great difficulty accepting such a precondition.

In the Citizens Proposal, we state our hope that the citizens of the two nations would develop and/or maintain the culture that they wish for their nations. In this sense, we do not see a problem per se with labeling Israel a Jewish state. However, a problem would exist if the culture of either nation does not support the rights and aspirations of all its citizens. The conditional statement, “a problem would exist if,” is to recognize the considerable ambiguity around the meaning of Jewish state.

Let us look at better uses of language and the meanings incurred in the phrase Jewish state. The meaning of Israel’s identity as a Jewish state is open to question because the definition of a Jewish state is not settled among Israelis themselves. Jews the world over even differ among themselves on what it means to be Jewish; hence, they could hardly be of one mind about what it means for Israel to be a Jewish state. Yet Palestinians would want to know, before they agree to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, just what they are signing off on.

• A Jewish State That Guarantees Equal Rights for All

While we would not be as presumptuous as to suggest to the citizens of Israel what sort of definition they should arrive at for a Jewish state, we would insist that it cannot be taken to mean that Israel has the cultural or national right to privilege its Jewish citizens over its Arab, Christian and Druze citizens, or oppress and restrict those minorities in any way. Nor would we wish it to advantage any particular type of Jew while restricting other Jewish communities that are in the minority.

Such a view is foreign to Israel’s founding documents, specifically its declaration of independence, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948).

The State of Israel will… foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions…

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The affirmation that “Israel will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex” and the averral that this guarantee was “envisaged by the prophets of Israel” mean that equal rights is a value that is rooted in the religion, history and ethics of the Jewish people. One can point to the Law of Moses: “You shall have one law for the sojourner and for the native.” Thus, equal rights can be construed not only as a democratic value but also as a Jewish value, one that should be codified in the laws of a Jewish state. Palestinians might find fewer reasons to object to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state if Israel, by its self-definition as a Jewish state, is committed to equal rights and protections for its non-Jewish and Arab minorities.

- A Jewish State That Does Not Surrender the Right of Return

A second reason why Palestinians would resist recognizing Israel as a Jewish state concerns the Right of Return. Because Israel was founded as a national home for Jews, the issue of the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees collides with a core Israeli understanding of what it means for Israel to be a Jewish state. However, it is our position that disposition of the Right of Return should be a topic for negotiation. We would neither expect, nor think it would be desirable for, the Palestinian Authority to agree to a de facto surrender of that right because it recognizes Israel’s identity as a Jewish state as a precondition to negotiations.

The rationale behind our position is that in order to achieve a lasting peace, the inflammatory issue of the Right of Return needs to be addressed properly. It will require negotiations between Palestine and Israel in which respect is proffered and a final agreement that takes into account the aspirations of both peoples. Considering the desire of Palestinians for some satisfaction on this issue, the Citizens Proposal envisions that a peace agreement may include provision for a fixed, limited number of Palestinians to settle in Israel—a number however that does not alter significantly the demographics of Israel as a state with a large Jewish majority.

The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel describes Israel’s Jewish identity in terms of a national home for Jews scattered throughout the world: “The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles.” This policy is enshrined in Israel’s Law of Return, which grants automatic citizenship to any Jew immigrating to Israel from any part of the world. We would affirm the view that to recognize Israel as a Jewish state is to affirm this particular privilege for Jews in matters of immigration policy, as it is rooted in Israel’s history and its reason for existence.

Nevertheless, in our view this does not necessarily imply the converse, namely that Israel by virtue of being a Jewish state ought to be excessively restrictive regarding citizenship issues for Palestinians. This applies particularly to those Palestinians who end up in Israel after a border is agreed upon, but also to those Palestinians who are afforded the opportunity to exercise their Right of Return within the provisions of a peace settlement. There is no reason why Israel as a Jewish homeland cannot also be the homeland of a thriving Palestinian minority. In short, it is incumbent upon Israel, if it expects Palestinians to recognize it as a Jewish state, to define the

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12 Leviticus 24:22, also Numbers 15:16.
13 Ibid.
meaning of a Jewish state in a way that does not exclude the possibility of limited Palestinian immigration.

- **A Jewish State That Benefits its Arab Neighbors**

A third aspect of what it may mean to be a Jewish state concerns Israel’s disposition towards its Arab neighbors. Many Jews regard themselves as a people chosen by God to be a blessing to all the peoples of the earth, as the Bible depicts God’s blessing to Abraham, “by you all the families of the earth will be blessed” (Genesis 12:3). Since Abraham is the father not only of the Jewish people but also of the Arab peoples, we suggest that when Israel acts in ways that benefit the Arab peoples in its vicinity, it is a Jewish state in the best sense of the term. In that spirit, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel avers that Israel intends to be a good neighbor, living in peace with neighboring Arab states and cooperating with them for mutual benefit:

WE EXTEND our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.

In this regard, a primary purpose of the Citizens Proposal is to create a border that can provide the context for improving the relationships between Israel and the nascent state of Palestine. It lays out zones of economic cooperation and joint management that could be pursued in the spirit of “establish[ing] bonds of cooperation and mutual help” with the newly created Palestine.

We believe that these are qualities of a Jewish state in the best sense of the term: They are rooted in the ideals of Judaism and consistent with the finest traditions of the Jewish people. If Israel defines itself as a Jewish state in the three senses described above, then the Palestinian Authority should have little quarrel with recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Yet it is incumbent upon Israel to first provide a clear definition of what it takes the phrase “a Jewish state” to mean, hopefully along the lines suggested above. Without such clarity, the demand that Palestine recognize Israel as a Jewish state serves no good purpose but becomes an obstacle in the path of resuming sincere negotiations that can lead to peace.
**Finding a Way Forward towards Negotiations: Can Palestinians Recognize Israel’s ”Jewish Character”?**

September 23, 2011

In an effort to overcome the hurdle of Israel’s requirement that Palestine recognize Israel as a Jewish State as a precondition to negotiations, we see that American mediators are suggesting a softer approach:

> The Palestinians would have to recognize Israel’s Jewish character if they were to reach a deal quickly, officials close to the talks said.\(^1\)

Noting Israel’s characteristics and qualities, the Jewish character of the State of Israel would seem to be a fact of life, not requiring manifold and/or tortuous efforts at definition that, as we have seen, would be necessary to clarify the issues around Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

In this regard, it should not be necessary for anyone to ask Israel for a clarification of what it may mean when it claims to have “a Jewish character.” It is something we can see and choose to appreciate, or not.

Having a Jewish character does not carry with it implications one way or the other about Israel’s constitution or basic law, nor does it carry with it any comment on its decisions regarding privileging its Jewish citizens or its non-Jewish citizens.

Importantly, recognizing Israel as having a Jewish character does not imply that the treaty establishing the two states should say anything one way or another about the Palestinians’ demand for a right of return. Instead, it leaves room for movement.

While it may support Israel to retain a Jewish majority, it matters not for the Jewish character of Israel per se whether its population is 76 percent Jews (as it is currently), or 56 percent Jews, or 96 percent Jews. The character of a nation is not governed by demography. It is a reality that stems from the character of its people, their history, and the culture they create.

We believe Israel will continue to strive for a pluralistic society, nation and state, because pluralism is deeply embedded within the Jewish character. We also affirm Israel’s willingness to participate productively in the region, along with all other member states and Palestine, because a sense of responsibility to benefit the wider humanity also is deeply embedded within the Jewish character.

Affirmation of the other’s character is part and parcel of good relations between states. It forms the basis for educating future citizens to live as good neighbors. Within reason then, agreeing to

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recognize Israel as having Jewish character is a good place to begin, even if it arises from a compromise in negotiations.

If the Palestinians will agree to this, it will be in the spirit of negotiation and working toward good neighborliness. Understandably it may be a bitter pill for them, given the current realities on the ground—a conflict that all want to move away from.

For Israel, while recognizing two states for two peoples may be a lesser form of acceptance, we believe it is appropriate for the Palestinians to affirm Israel’s Jewish character. Israel’s willingness to make this compromise is commendable.

Thus, we hope that Palestinians will give on recognition of Israel’s Jewish character. We also hope that they will accept a timetable, as was suggested by French president Sarkozy and now is being presented by the entire Quartet, in lieu of any demands over settlements. We see reasonable evidence that such a timetable could produce a state acceptable to both parties, and so we encourage it.
Next Steps: Negotiating an Initial Border

October 18, 2011

The Citizens Proposal recognizes that for negotiations to be successful, the main focus of discussion should be on Jerusalem. Jerusalem is certainly the most difficult issue to resolve, and will no doubt require difficult compromises for both Palestinians and Israelis.

In past efforts at negotiating a settlement, such as at Camp David in 2000 and at Taba in 2001, progress was made on the wider border issues, such as negotiating what percentage of land within the 1967 lines would be swapped for land within Israel. However, the issue of sovereignty over neighborhoods in Jerusalem proved more intractable. It makes sense, therefore, that the other, less contentious parts of the border should be dealt with first, before the two sides get down to a substantive discussion on the borders of Jerusalem.

We therefore propose a staged process, in two installments. It is designed to keep negotiations on track, enabling a complete resolution of all issues.

First Border Installment: Decide the Borders to the North and to the South of Jerusalem and Resolve Security Issues

In the First Installment, negotiations could determine the border sections to the north and south of Jerusalem. For the border of the northern West Bank, we suggest a southern terminus on the 1967 line north of Mevaseret Tzion and its northern terminus where the 1967 line meets the Jordan River. For the border of the southern West Bank we have designated a northern terminus on the 1967 line between Batir and al-Walaja and its southern terminus where the 1967 line meets the Dead Sea. (The terminus points near Jerusalem are indicated on the maps below by red circles.)

For these sections north and south, the borders depicted in the Citizens Proposal would be an appropriate resolution that would serve the interests of Israelis and Palestinians alike, and we urge the negotiators to consider adopting them as a fixed border.

However, our proposed border does not preclude territorial exchanges to compensate Palestine for land east of the 1967 line that is given to Israel; territory under consideration for exchange could be adjacent to Gaza or on the western side of the 1967 line or both.

In this First Installment, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators could also come to a resolution on security issues.

This First Installment could be completed quickly through straightforward negotiations, as the issues are well known.
1. Section of the Border of the Northern West Bank to be Determined in the First Installment
The border section of the southern West Bank terminates in what the Citizens Proposal calls the “women’s border” in the area of Batir and al-Walaja. (The role of women in stabilizing and the southern border of Jerusalem, with its considerable traffic between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, is an important feature of the Citizens Proposal.)
Second Border Installment: Determine the Borders of Jerusalem and the Rights of Israeli Citizens in Palestine

With agreement on the First Installment, the issues of Jerusalem and settlements can be addressed. However, the border drawn in the First Installment will have already clarified the fate of many of the settlements as lying either within Israel or within Palestine. What remains to be discussed, and what will be a point of concern for Israel, is the rights and status of Israeli citizens or former citizens who might wish to remain in their homes within the State of Palestine. They will want legal protections, property rights, assurances of unrestricted access by road to Israel, and the right to live in peace and security. They will demand freedom of religion. They will also want political rights, either as a minority in Palestine or as dual citizens with a vote in Israeli elections.

Moreover, the city of Ariel, which the Citizens Proposal places in an Autonomous Economic Zone, would need specific guarantees of rights and privileges, as well as a mechanism to manage the Zone’s joint governance, so it could become a model community for joint economic development. The large community of Ma’ale Adumim, which depending on negotiations may either fall within Palestine or become an island enclave, would need specific guarantees as to property rights and/or road access.

In return for Palestinian guarantees for the rights of Israelis remaining in Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim, and as a settled minority within Palestine, Israel might be willing to concede many of the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem to Palestine. Linking these two issues may facilitate more balanced negotiations over Jerusalem, with dignity and benefits to both sides.

It is in both sides’ best interests to encourage a flourishing Jewish minority in Palestine, because this will require the dislocation of the fewest people. The assumption of some proposals that most or all Israeli settlers will resettle in Israel rather than live in Palestine places a heavy burden on both sides. It increases the reluctance of Israel to part with settlements and makes it likely that it will demand more land from Palestine in order to preserve them. The Citizens Proposal provides Palestine with a contiguous state, with few Israeli incursions, because it operates from the assumption that Palestine will welcome Israelis to remain in their communities and help enrich Palestine’s economic and social life. Hence, the focus of the Second Installment is not to preserve settlements but to protect the rights of people.

To summarize, we propose that negotiations for a final settlement of the Israel-Palestine border may be expedited if they are undertaken in two installments: The First Installment is to negotiate an initial border for sections of the West Bank north and south of Jerusalem from the terminus points marked above to the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, respectively. The Second Installment is to negotiate in tandem the status of Jerusalem and the rights of settled Israelis who choose to remain in Palestine.
Israel: Stubborn Resistance to the Road Map

December 17, 2011

Recently Israel announced the establishment of two new settlement areas just south of the Palestinian city of Bethlehem that may threaten to scuttle the hopes of the world community for a viable two-state solution. As part of a strategic encirclement of Bethlehem, and further by cutting a wedge between Bethlehem and Hebron, they would effectively disrupt the contiguity of the southern West Bank.

The first of these areas, Givat Hadagan, is only a few hundred yards south of the Deheisha refugee camp and the Bethlehem suburb of al-Khadr. It had been an unauthorized settlement, a collection of trailer homes forming the campus of a religious Zionist yeshiva. Now with state approval, some 40 single-family homes are to be built there. The second is a newly designated farm, called Givat Eitam, which is to be established east of Givat Hadagan and just south of the Bethlehem suburb of Irtas.

Both settlements represent expansions of the Etzion Bloc, a settled district east of the 1949 Armistice Line. In the various proposals that have been put forth for the border of the West Bank, the Etzion Bloc is among the areas most often slated for inclusion in Israel through a land swap. According to a report in Haaretz, the settlements were authorized by the Israeli Defense Forces and approved by Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Yet for a government that says it wants a two-state solution, to proceed with this action calls into serious question its choices, as to whether such a change to the facts on the ground can in fact provide for a two-state solution that is viable. This action may be perceived as Israeli capitulation to extreme rightist elements whose purpose is to make a Palestinian state untenable.

Further Fragmentation of the West Bank and the Problem with Ill-advised Expansion

To fully grasp the problem of these settlements, one must look at the Etzion Bloc and its geographical relationship to the rest of the West Bank. The Etzion Bloc with its eleven Jewish communities occupies land southwest of Bethlehem, from Beitar Ilit to Efrat and south as far as Migdal Oz. While it is heavily settled with Jews and boasts a history of Jewish presence prior to 1948, this area will be of concern to Palestinians because it straddles Route 60, the main north–south trunk road connecting the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem and Hebron. Contiguity in the West Bank requires that Route 60 be open to Palestinian traffic. Unless this artery is preserved,
Palestinians living in Hebron and surrounding communities who wish to travel north to Bethlehem will be forced to take a roundabout route through the hills to the east.

Therefore, if the Etzion Bloc becomes part of Israel, another road within Palestine should be built to replace it. A ready solution to preserve Palestinian access and contiguity would be to build a bypass road just east of Efrat. It would intersect Route 60 just south of Bethlehem at al-Khadr, and rejoin Route 60 at Mu‘askar al-‘Arub, below the southernmost point of the Etzion Bloc at Migdal Oz. Palestinians could then use the bypass road to travel between Bethlehem to Hebron without entering any agreed upon Israeli territory.

However, these new settlements will effectively eliminate that option by blocking what would have been the route of the bypass road and thus cutting off Palestinian access to Route 60 south of Bethlehem. They change the character of the Etzion Bloc from a relatively uncontroversial slice of territory near the 1949 lines to a contentious and intrusive wedge extending deep into the West Bank. The good people of the Etzion Bloc should not be drawn into such contention by this ill-advised expansion.

The issue of contiguity raised by these settlements is not unique to the Etzion bloc. In the north, the proliferation of settlements has created similar wedges of Israeli land protruding deep into the West Bank: a line of settlements extending west to east along Route 5 from Elkanah to Ariel, and another from Alfe Menashe to Immanuel. These fingers of land, if allowed to stand in a final agreement, would likewise be incompatible with the contiguity of a future Palestine.

Consider also the effect of these settlements on Bethlehem, an important Palestinian city. Urban areas need room to expand through the natural growth of their suburbs. Yet Bethlehem is constrained to the north by Jerusalem and its suburbs of Gilo and Har Homa and to the west by the settlement of Har Gilo. Now the Jewish salient created by these new settlements will obstruct Bethlehem’s expansion to the south.

**Leadership by the International Community**

The United States, as part of the Quartet, has laid out a road map for Israel and Palestine to arrive at a durable peace. It requires that the Palestinians be given a viable state, and a viable state is characterized by territorial contiguity. President George W. Bush spoke of this principle at a joint press conference with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on May 26, 2005:

> A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work... This is the position of the United States today; it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.

Regardless of any Israeli affirmation of this principle, it seems clear that, with its authorization of these new settlements, Israel is at the very least complicit in purposeful works to reduce the territory of a future Palestine to “a state of scattered territories,” as natural access routes may be severed by wedges of Israeli land.
No durable peace is possible in a state without contiguity. If the Palestinians were to accept an agreement that offers them a state where their basic needs for access and living space will go unmet, in times to come, seething resentment and a smoldering sense of injustice could become a cause for reigniting the conflict.

Therefore, it is time for the United States to reassert the principles of the road map and for the Quartet to exercise more muscular persuasion. The international community needs to remind the Israelis of what is in their long-term security interests, which is to live at peace with their Palestinian counterparts as good neighbors.

Israel’s continued recalcitrance comes from pandering to the settler movement and its self-absorbed drive to expand Jewish control of the West Bank at the expense of the Palestinians. The settler movement, in this act, does not “wish” to live in good neighborly relations or even to regard Palestinians as human beings equal to themselves. Instead, they treat them with the disdain comparable to how 19th-century colonial powers treated indigenous peoples. Yet all over the world, history shows that such mistreatment leads only to rivers of blood.

Preventing such a tragic outcome would require the Israeli Defense Forces to put the welfare of the nation first and stand up against the settler movement. On December 13 a mob of settlers attacked a West Bank military base, throwing rocks, burning tires, and vandalizing military vehicles; one officer was wounded. The next day, a prominent settler activist called on IDF soldiers to sabotage army equipment. Meanwhile, “price tag” attacks have continued to vandalize mosques and Arab property, not only on the West Bank but also within Israel. Yet despite tough words by Prime Minister Netanyahu branding these settlers as “terrorists,” typically they are not arrested, or, if they are, they get no more than a slap on the wrist. How can Israel continue to pander to the settler movement by approving additional settlements after seeing settlers attack the much respected IDF and deface property within its own borders?

We appeal to the conscience of Israel and Judaism, reminding Israelis of the Golden Rule as stated long ago by Rabbi Hillel: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah” (Shab. 31a). Peace and security for Israel should be based on the principles of justice and mercy, not lawlessness and disregard for the well-being of its Arab neighbors. These contentious settlements foster hate; they do not support peace.
Security and Borders: Both Required for Peace

January 14, 2012

Security is enhanced through good borders. As the adage goes, “Good fences make good neighbors.” When Israel and the Palestinians have a fixed border that both sides can accept, that in itself will contribute greatly towards a positive security environment for Israel. A border between Israel and the West Bank will produce a safer and more secure Israel, safer and more secure than what can be gained through occupation, annexation, or expansion of settlements in the West Bank.

Borders and security together will achieve peace, but neither one can achieve peace by itself. A border alone cannot deliver peace, as security concerns cannot be gainsaid, but neither can a policy that focuses on security alone bring peace. As twin pillars of Israeli policy, borders and security would complement each other to promote peace. In other words, the cry from some corners of Israel that a negotiated border with Palestine is inimical to Israel’s security is based on a false dichotomy. Borders and security are not opposed to each other; rather, they support each other.

How a Border Enhances Security

An agreed-upon border with the Palestinians on the West Bank will enhance Israel’s security environment in numerous ways.

First, an agreed-upon border will remove a huge swathe of frictions between Israel and the Palestinians, including those arising from competition for land rights and resources, from the innumerable indignities suffered due to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands, and from the Palestinians’ existential anxiety over whether they can have a future. Currently the Palestinian population in the West Bank is managing their behavior in response to these frictions without violence, but if there is no improvement, Palestinian patience may one day run out. When that day comes, Israel could face renewed violence and painful loss of life.

Conversely, establishing a border will greatly reduce the propensity for Palestinians to resort to violence as a response to such unmet needs. Instead, the possibility of settled life within defined borders will open doors to increased economic development, trade, and joint projects. It will enhance all manner of cross-border human relationships and friendships amongst people with ties in both nations. It will clarify citizenship and residency issues for thousands who for years have lived in legal limbo. Thus, the settled environment of an established border can promote many virtuous links between the two peoples. In time, these developments could bring Israelis and Palestinians to regard each other no longer as enemies but as partners.

Second, an agreed-upon border will improve Israel’s security by enhancing the effectiveness of its military. It will enable a strategic redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) along shorter and more defensible lines. It will improve morale among IDF troops by relieving them of the moral burden of enforcing an occupation that runs contrary to Jewish values and by
eliminating friction with settlers and their private militias. Further, it will allow a reduction in Israel’s defense budget and give a needed economic boost to Israel’s suffering middle class.

A border would not have to compromise Israel’s military readiness to counter enemies east of the Jordan River. As part of a comprehensive final status agreement, Israel can certainly negotiate a bilateral agreement with the new Palestinian state to lease land for radar installations and forward bases, to secure fly-over rights over Palestinian airspace, and to permit movement of troops through Palestine in the event of war.

Third, setting up an agreed-upon border and ending the occupation of the West Bank will also enhance Israel’s security by improving its international standing. This will enable Israel to achieve numerous diplomatic goals linked to security, including upgraded relations with neighboring Arab states that would enhance the formation of a unified front against the threat from a nuclear Iran. It will contribute to the marginalization of Hamas and to the prospects of regime change in Gaza, as Palestinians there see the benefits that peace brings to the West Bank. A comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority will also put Israel in a stronger position to deal with Hezbollah and Syria.

**The West Bank Barrier Fence and Security**

Good fences can make for good neighbors, but poorly conceived fences and fences built on disputed land create conflict. Israel’s West Bank barrier fence was intended in the first place as a bulwark against terrorism. Supporters of the fence point to the decline in terrorist attacks since its construction as evidence that it is fulfilling its security purpose. However, this statistical decline may have little to do with the fence, as it could just as well be attributed to Palestinian self-restraint after the end of the Second Intifada.

If the security fence had simply followed the 1947 armistice line, a line agreed to by the Palestinians, it might conceivably have made for good neighborly relations and good security as well. However, this purpose was compromised when the route of the security fence was adjusted to support settlements deep inside the West Bank. Today, instead of hewing close to the 1947 armistice line, the security fence carves out large swathes of the West Bank around the Israeli settlements there. This unilateral action by Israel cannot be said to have created a border, because there is no agreement from the other side. Furthermore, Palestinian complaints that the fence has severed families from their lands and destroyed their agricultural base largely arise in areas where the route of the fence supports the settlements.

**The Settlements and Security**

Today, the settler movement has clearly emerged as the greatest obstacle to the sort of border we envisage between Israel and Palestine, one that both sides could reasonably be expected to agree to. If, as argued above, a border is in the best interests of Israel’s national security, then Israel’s felt responsibility to protect the security of the settlements is profoundly at odds with its security as a nation.
Nevertheless, many Israelis identify the settler movement with Israel’s security. This has roots in Israel’s history going back to its founding. During Israel’s war for independence, Jewish settlements were the front line and Jewish settlers bore the brunt of Arab attacks. After the 1967 war when Israel gained control over the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, intrepid Jews quickly established settlements, both kibbutzim and military encampments, to establish Israeli sovereignty over the newly won territory. The West Bank kibbutzim on the Jordan River and the settlements established in the Golan became the new front line, looking out at potentially hostile Jordan and Syria. Some West Bank settlements, such as Ariel, were approved because they stood at strategic locations to block possible invasion routes from Jordan. Still others, notably those in the Etzion Bloc southwest of Jerusalem, were set up to reestablish Jewish communities that had been driven out or massacred during the war for independence. By establishing Israeli presence on its borders with the Arab states, these settlements were thus an integral part of Israel’s security apparatus.

The rationale for certain settlements, notably suburbs in Jerusalem’s eastern environs such as Gilo and Pisgat Ze’ev, made a plausible link between security and territorial expansion. Israel’s experience in its war of independence was that Jerusalem, because of its geographical penetration into the West Bank, was difficult to defend. It was therefore understood that a larger metropolitan area around Jerusalem under Israeli control would enhance the city’s security.

However, at some point in the 1980s, the settler movement began to influence Israeli thinking towards the dream of a national destiny in which the entire occupied West Bank would be transformed into a Jewish nation. The dream of Jews living throughout the biblical territories of “Judea and Samaria” was alluring to many. Movements like Gush Emunim established settlements in the West Bank, not for security but for the dream of a Jewish West Bank. Yet one would be hard-pressed to make a cogent case for how pursuing this dream enhances Israel’s national security, given the presence of 2.3 million Palestinians there as against 300,000 Jewish settlers.

Meanwhile, other settlements were developed as real estate ventures to attract home buyers and renters by offering inexpensive housing. Many of the residents in these settlements are not there for ideology, but for economic reasons. Again, it can hardly be said that such settlements enhance Israel’s national security.

Thus, today the nature of settlement movement, which at its inception was an integral part of Israeli national security strategy, has so changed that it can no longer be said to serve a national security purpose. Nevertheless, the historical connection between the settlements and security remains a potent idea in the minds of many Israelis. Therefore, it is important for Israel to take a sober look at the security implications of the settlements, particularly in light of the considerable security benefit that would accrue from establishing a true border. It is time to decouple the settlements from security and instead look at the settlements within the framework of Israel’s overall security needs.

Israel has a responsibility to protect its citizens in the settlements. Nevertheless, protecting settlers does not necessarily require that all settlements be included within the State of Israel. For those settlers who end up living within a new Palestinian state, Israel and Palestine should work
out security guarantees by treaty. Namely, persistence of settlement communities in the West Bank need not stand in the way of a border.

In the current negotiations, we ask Israel to reconsider its stance that security concerns should be paramount, particularly if security is understood as a euphemism for protecting the political interests of the settler movement. In fact the settler movement does not benefit Israel’s security but instead complicates it.

A focus entirely on security while ignoring the issue of borders will bring neither peace nor security. Rather, let the government of Israel change its focus to arriving at an agreement on borders. Once a border is established and security is managed in the context of two states, there can be lasting peace indeed.