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Israel Can Win in Gaza, But Not Now
November 15, 2012
Israel has every justification for responding to Hamas’s provocative rocket attacks and neutralizing its ability to fire missiles on its population. However, in the absence of a long-term strategy, Operation Pillar of Defense is liable to repeat the same futile effort as the 2008-09 Operation Cast Lead. That three-week ground offensive was ostensibly to degrade Hamas’s military capability and damage its leadership, but clearly it did not succeed in its objectives. Today Hamas is stronger than ever, and together with other radical Gazan splinter groups, its threat to Israel undiminished. Hamas undoubtedly believes that as they bloodied Israel’s nose then, they can do so again now.
In a short ground war, Hamas stands to benefit. Even if many of its leaders are killed, those who survive will be seen as the “tip of the spear” to fight Israel. It will further their objective to gain supremacy in the long-running power struggle within Hamas between Gaza and its overseas branch, now in Cairo. In a longer war, Hamas’s fighters are motivated, especially if defending their homes. If the battle is taken to Gaza City, in house-to-house fighting the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will suffer significant casualties. Furthermore, Hamas now has the support of Egypt, which, ruled by the like-minded Muslim Brotherhood, has already recalled its ambassador to Israel. A long-term conflict with Gaza would risk Egypt terminating its peace treaty with Israel. The consequences for Israel’s security would be incalculable.
In the short run it may seem justifiable to attack Gaza, but in the absence of a clear strategy and end-game, the results could end up being worse for Israel than when Israel attacked Gaza four years ago. Let’s consider the options.
The first is a short offensive, either limited to an air war or coupled with a short ground offensive into Gaza and then withdrawing after a few weeks. It could be a politically popular option if there are few Israeli casualties and it brings Hamas to heel. The diplomatic fallout would be contained, and it would preserve the military’s flexibility to deal with Iran. However, as with Operation Cast Lead, it would most likely not break Hamas. The best Israel can hope for would be a temporary lull while Hamas recoups and re-arms.
The second option is a long-term occupation of Gaza. It would no doubt be costly, brutal and require the Israeli public to accept a weekly death-count as its soldiers face the sort of ambushes and IEDs that are now the bane of American forces in Afghanistan. The IDF would risk overextending its forces, which already must devote significant resources to defending settlements in the West Bank, not to mention preparing to contend with Iran. We could see a scenario play out much like Afghanistan, as the Gazans’ persistent resistance over the years wears down Israel’s resolve.
A third option is an occupation whose objective would be regime change. It would require measures to “pacify” the population of Gaza by charitable “nation-building” activities to win hearts and minds, as the Americans did in their postwar occupation of Japan and as they tried to do in Iraq. Pacification strategies are less costly, because they enlist the help of sympathetic locals who oppose the existing regime to form new governing elites. Thus, Israel would, with this option, be able to work for the clear goal of replacing Hamas with a Palestinian regime amenable to peaceful co-existence with Israel. Certainly this would be a path to a permanent solution to the problem of terrorism emanating from Gaza.
We do not hear Israeli officials discussing this approach in public. They may believe that Gaza is a tiger that cannot be tamed. But a more significant problem is Israel’s poor working relationship with the obvious choice to replace Hamas in Gaza, namely the Palestinian Authority of President Mahmoud Abbas. In recent years the Palestinian Authority has cooperated with Israeli security forces to arrest and eliminate Hamas operatives in the West Bank. It would like nothing better than to supplant Hamas in Gaza and once again be the only legitimate governing authority in Palestine.
Yet by treating Abbas as an opponent instead of a partner for peace, Israel has squandered its main asset that would be quite valuable in dealing with Gaza for the purpose of regime change. Instead of appreciating the history of cooperation with Abbas in security matters, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has recently called for his ouster. Instead of giving Abbas legitimacy as the governing authority of Palestine, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued a policy of aggressive expansion of settlements in the West Bank that has until now scuppered any chance of negotiating a two-state solution. Hence, Abbas, despairing of an agreement with Israel, has gone to the United Nations.
There is no getting around the linkage between Gaza and the larger problem of negotiating a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If managed properly, a two-state solution can also solve the Gaza problem. But the current hostilities between Israel and Gaza could very easily become a stumbling-block to achieving a two-state solution.
Consider the diplomatic consequences of these hostilities, given the imminent passage of a UN General Assembly resolution granting Palestine observer state status. This writer has argued that on November 29, when the international community affirms that Palestine is a state, a door will open to negotiations without conditions between the parties that can lead to a final settlement. Upon achievement of observer state status, Abbas has said he will drop as a precondition the demand that Israel cease settlement construction—a demand Israel has refused to honor. He indicated that he will negotiate with Israel even though they continue to build in new settlements. With that stumbling-block removed, Israel and Palestine would have no reason not to sit down and negotiate.
Successful negotiations after November 29 will require a period of calm, in which both sides refrain from the usual retaliatory actions and instead take advantage of the diplomatic opening. Yet many in Netanyahu’s government are so fixated on the tit-for-tat, business-as-usual paradigm of relations that they believe Abbas’s primary reason for seeking observer state status at the UN is to gain the right to begin prosecuting Israel in the International Criminal Court. This is a misreading of Abbas’s intentions. It is more than likely that Abbas wants to hold off on taking such a step in order to pursue a negotiated settlement.
But what if on November 29 an Israeli invasion force is sitting on Gazan soil, which is part of Palestine? In those circumstances, Abbas will have to deal with the indignation of his people, perhaps giving him no choice but to go to the ICC in protest. Israel’s actions in Gaza will have made for a self-fulfilling prophecy, and another opportunity for negotiating the final status of a two-state solution will have been wasted.
From a strategic perspective, Israel needs to make peace with the Palestinian Authority if it is to have the leverage it needs to defeat Hamas. Yes, Hamas is an immediate threat, while the West Bank has lived in relative peace with Israel. But for Israel to indulge in such short-term thinking, to simply put out fires without addressing their cause, is misguided. Placing the conflict with Hamas ahead of solving the problem of the West Bank makes the solution of both more intractable. An honorable and just peace with the Palestinian Authority, through negotiations to establish a Palestinian state with its borders roughly at 1967 line with some adjustments for settlement blocs, is the only way to build up the strategic assets required to dislodge Hamas from Gaza once and for all.
In short, Israel should limit its current campaign against Hamas to a week and avoid a ground war. It should cease hostilities well before November 29, to give negotiations a chance. There is a way to solve the problem of terrorism in Gaza, but that path runs through Ramallah.
Israel has every justification for responding to Hamas’s provocative rocket attacks and neutralizing its ability to fire missiles on its population. However, in the absence of a long-term strategy, Operation Pillar of Defense is liable to repeat the same futile effort as the 2008-09 Operation Cast Lead. That three-week ground offensive was ostensibly to degrade Hamas’s military capability and damage its leadership, but clearly it did not succeed in its objectives. Today Hamas is stronger than ever, and together with other radical Gazan splinter groups, its threat to Israel undiminished. Hamas undoubtedly believes that as they bloodied Israel’s nose then, they can do so again now.
In a short ground war, Hamas stands to benefit. Even if many of its leaders are killed, those who survive will be seen as the “tip of the spear” to fight Israel. It will further their objective to gain supremacy in the long-running power struggle within Hamas between Gaza and its overseas branch, now in Cairo. In a longer war, Hamas’s fighters are motivated, especially if defending their homes. If the battle is taken to Gaza City, in house-to-house fighting the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will suffer significant casualties. Furthermore, Hamas now has the support of Egypt, which, ruled by the like-minded Muslim Brotherhood, has already recalled its ambassador to Israel. A long-term conflict with Gaza would risk Egypt terminating its peace treaty with Israel. The consequences for Israel’s security would be incalculable.
In the short run it may seem justifiable to attack Gaza, but in the absence of a clear strategy and end-game, the results could end up being worse for Israel than when Israel attacked Gaza four years ago. Let’s consider the options.
The first is a short offensive, either limited to an air war or coupled with a short ground offensive into Gaza and then withdrawing after a few weeks. It could be a politically popular option if there are few Israeli casualties and it brings Hamas to heel. The diplomatic fallout would be contained, and it would preserve the military’s flexibility to deal with Iran. However, as with Operation Cast Lead, it would most likely not break Hamas. The best Israel can hope for would be a temporary lull while Hamas recoups and re-arms.
The second option is a long-term occupation of Gaza. It would no doubt be costly, brutal and require the Israeli public to accept a weekly death-count as its soldiers face the sort of ambushes and IEDs that are now the bane of American forces in Afghanistan. The IDF would risk overextending its forces, which already must devote significant resources to defending settlements in the West Bank, not to mention preparing to contend with Iran. We could see a scenario play out much like Afghanistan, as the Gazans’ persistent resistance over the years wears down Israel’s resolve.
A third option is an occupation whose objective would be regime change. It would require measures to “pacify” the population of Gaza by charitable “nation-building” activities to win hearts and minds, as the Americans did in their postwar occupation of Japan and as they tried to do in Iraq. Pacification strategies are less costly, because they enlist the help of sympathetic locals who oppose the existing regime to form new governing elites. Thus, Israel would, with this option, be able to work for the clear goal of replacing Hamas with a Palestinian regime amenable to peaceful co-existence with Israel. Certainly this would be a path to a permanent solution to the problem of terrorism emanating from Gaza.
We do not hear Israeli officials discussing this approach in public. They may believe that Gaza is a tiger that cannot be tamed. But a more significant problem is Israel’s poor working relationship with the obvious choice to replace Hamas in Gaza, namely the Palestinian Authority of President Mahmoud Abbas. In recent years the Palestinian Authority has cooperated with Israeli security forces to arrest and eliminate Hamas operatives in the West Bank. It would like nothing better than to supplant Hamas in Gaza and once again be the only legitimate governing authority in Palestine.
Yet by treating Abbas as an opponent instead of a partner for peace, Israel has squandered its main asset that would be quite valuable in dealing with Gaza for the purpose of regime change. Instead of appreciating the history of cooperation with Abbas in security matters, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has recently called for his ouster. Instead of giving Abbas legitimacy as the governing authority of Palestine, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pursued a policy of aggressive expansion of settlements in the West Bank that has until now scuppered any chance of negotiating a two-state solution. Hence, Abbas, despairing of an agreement with Israel, has gone to the United Nations.
There is no getting around the linkage between Gaza and the larger problem of negotiating a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If managed properly, a two-state solution can also solve the Gaza problem. But the current hostilities between Israel and Gaza could very easily become a stumbling-block to achieving a two-state solution.
Consider the diplomatic consequences of these hostilities, given the imminent passage of a UN General Assembly resolution granting Palestine observer state status. This writer has argued that on November 29, when the international community affirms that Palestine is a state, a door will open to negotiations without conditions between the parties that can lead to a final settlement. Upon achievement of observer state status, Abbas has said he will drop as a precondition the demand that Israel cease settlement construction—a demand Israel has refused to honor. He indicated that he will negotiate with Israel even though they continue to build in new settlements. With that stumbling-block removed, Israel and Palestine would have no reason not to sit down and negotiate.
Successful negotiations after November 29 will require a period of calm, in which both sides refrain from the usual retaliatory actions and instead take advantage of the diplomatic opening. Yet many in Netanyahu’s government are so fixated on the tit-for-tat, business-as-usual paradigm of relations that they believe Abbas’s primary reason for seeking observer state status at the UN is to gain the right to begin prosecuting Israel in the International Criminal Court. This is a misreading of Abbas’s intentions. It is more than likely that Abbas wants to hold off on taking such a step in order to pursue a negotiated settlement.
But what if on November 29 an Israeli invasion force is sitting on Gazan soil, which is part of Palestine? In those circumstances, Abbas will have to deal with the indignation of his people, perhaps giving him no choice but to go to the ICC in protest. Israel’s actions in Gaza will have made for a self-fulfilling prophecy, and another opportunity for negotiating the final status of a two-state solution will have been wasted.
From a strategic perspective, Israel needs to make peace with the Palestinian Authority if it is to have the leverage it needs to defeat Hamas. Yes, Hamas is an immediate threat, while the West Bank has lived in relative peace with Israel. But for Israel to indulge in such short-term thinking, to simply put out fires without addressing their cause, is misguided. Placing the conflict with Hamas ahead of solving the problem of the West Bank makes the solution of both more intractable. An honorable and just peace with the Palestinian Authority, through negotiations to establish a Palestinian state with its borders roughly at 1967 line with some adjustments for settlement blocs, is the only way to build up the strategic assets required to dislodge Hamas from Gaza once and for all.
In short, Israel should limit its current campaign against Hamas to a week and avoid a ground war. It should cease hostilities well before November 29, to give negotiations a chance. There is a way to solve the problem of terrorism in Gaza, but that path runs through Ramallah.
