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- Playing the Victim Card Will Not Bring Peace
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- The World Should Help the Palestinian Hunger Striker
- ...and only afterwards move to discuss the topic of Jerusalem
- A Question of Accountability
- Israel Twisting in the Wind
- Netanyahu: Too Big for His Britches
- Netanyahu's "Israeli Comfort"
- How Shaul Mofaz Can Jump-Start the Peace Process
- Netanyahu on the Brink
- Time for Taking Stock
- Israel in Wonderland
- Whatever Happened to the Quartet?
- The Palestinians Want to Negotiate
- A Time for Hope and a Call for Restraint
- Israel Can Win in Gaza, But Not Now
- Congratulations to the New State of Palestine!
- Security and Borders: Both Required for Peace
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- It Is Up to Israel to Restart Peace Negotiations
- Israel and Palestine: Changing the Terms of Agreement
- The Knesset Bill to Increase the Number of Women that Elect the Chief Rabbis Is Important for Jewish Women
- Proposal on Governance of the Holy Basin
- Time for Netanyahu to Reach Across the Aisle
- Tzipi Livni's Challenge
- Women Should Be Free to Pray at the Wailing Wall
- Proposed Highway through the Jordan Valley Will Backfire on Israel
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2015
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- We Should Applaud Herzog and Livni for Reclaiming Zionism
- The Next Israeli Government
- West Bank Citizenry and Receipt of Individuals of Palestinian Origin
- What Next for Israel?
- Palestinian statehood
- Mischief in the Trade Legislation would Hinder Progress
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Time for Taking Stock
July 29, 2012
In May this website had set store in the sudden arrival of Shaul Mofaz and his Kadima party into Israel’s coalition government, which offered an opportunity for the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. These hopes were dashed earlier this month when Mofaz left the coalition, just as suddenly as he arrived. His ability to work on the Palestinian issue would have been predicated on developing a good working relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Yet Mofaz could not surmount relatively minor disagreements over a law he had promised to enact, which would have ended the exemption for the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jewish minority from military or other national service.
In turning out Mofaz, Netanyahu decided to placate his Haredi allies with a weak law. Yet ending their long-time exemption was popular with the Israeli public. Even his largest coalition partner, Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Beiteinu party, strongly supported universal military service for the Haredi Jews. Now Netanyahu finds himself in a politically weakened position of once again relying on his narrow right-wing coalition, beholden to the Haredi parties and the settlers in the right wing of his Likud Party yet despised by the secular Israeli center for perpetuating injustice.
The settlers are still restive and, as they did in May, they will make Netanyahu’s life difficult if he does not continue to play their game. The July 10 publication of the Levy Report and Dani Dayan’s July 25 New York Times Op-ed piece “Israel’s Settlers Are Here to Stay,” both declaring that the West Bank should not be considered occupied land, demonstrate a new boldness. Netanyahu can expect trouble soon enough, when the extension granted by the High Court of Justice expires on August 21 and the government must evict settlers from Migron.
Yesterday’s orchestrated visit of Mitt Romney will do little to buttress Netanyahu’s fragile position. Settler advocacy of a single state for Jews inclusive of the West Bank—something near to an apartheid state—will not play well among American Jews, who want to believe that Israel shares their democratic values. It will damage American security interests, is likely to erode American support for Israel, and could even backfire on Romney’s campaign. Among Israelis, the financial costs of underwriting the settlers are a growing concern.
Regarding the Palestinian Authority, in our opinion they missed a precious opportunity when President Abbas canceled the meeting with Mofaz in Ramallah earlier this month. The Palestinians could have seen Mofaz as a potential peace partner, but things were handled clumsily from the outset. The demonstrations by Ramallah residents against Mofaz could have been anticipated, given Mofaz’s past military record in putting down the Second Intifada with brutal effectiveness. This suggests that the location was poorly chosen and that a venue outside of the region—perhaps in Europe—would have better served the purpose of beginning exploratory talks.
The Palestinians have yet to learn the subtleties of Israeli coalition politics and how to use them to their advantage. Netanyahu’s desire to keep Mofaz in the coalition could have been played as leverage to exact concessions. Mofaz joined the coalition to achieve four objectives, among them the end of the Haredi exemption and a deal with the Palestinians. Hence, once the Palestinians saw that Netanyahu needed Mofaz to cave in on the issue of Haredi exemptions, they could have signaled to Netanyahu that they would have entertained a concession to advance the peace process—a substantial prisoner release, for example—to enable Mofaz save face with his Kadima party. If Netanyahu had obliged to keep Mofaz in the government, hundreds of Palestinians might be walking free today.
In sum, the Palestinians would do well to respond with more alacrity to opportunities to negotiate with an Israeli government whose intransigence disguises deep fractures. Doing so can reap unexpected dividends.
Meanwhile, in our view the Palestinian Authority is correct to proceed with its effort to achieve recognition as a non-member state by the UN General Assembly. Doing so will lay the groundwork for meaningful negotiations where the deck is not stacked in Israel’s favor. While Israeli proposals for the borders of a Palestinian state are likely to be based on the route of the security barrier, UN recognition will be of a state based on the 1967 borders. In the Citizens Proposal we take the position that the border of a viable Palestinian state, where the population can live in a contiguous territory with room for natural population growth, and the border of Israel, one that recognizes the investment of Jews who live in the larger settlements, must take into account both positions.
In May this website had set store in the sudden arrival of Shaul Mofaz and his Kadima party into Israel’s coalition government, which offered an opportunity for the resumption of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. These hopes were dashed earlier this month when Mofaz left the coalition, just as suddenly as he arrived. His ability to work on the Palestinian issue would have been predicated on developing a good working relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Yet Mofaz could not surmount relatively minor disagreements over a law he had promised to enact, which would have ended the exemption for the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) Jewish minority from military or other national service.
In turning out Mofaz, Netanyahu decided to placate his Haredi allies with a weak law. Yet ending their long-time exemption was popular with the Israeli public. Even his largest coalition partner, Avigdor Lieberman’s Israel Beiteinu party, strongly supported universal military service for the Haredi Jews. Now Netanyahu finds himself in a politically weakened position of once again relying on his narrow right-wing coalition, beholden to the Haredi parties and the settlers in the right wing of his Likud Party yet despised by the secular Israeli center for perpetuating injustice.
The settlers are still restive and, as they did in May, they will make Netanyahu’s life difficult if he does not continue to play their game. The July 10 publication of the Levy Report and Dani Dayan’s July 25 New York Times Op-ed piece “Israel’s Settlers Are Here to Stay,” both declaring that the West Bank should not be considered occupied land, demonstrate a new boldness. Netanyahu can expect trouble soon enough, when the extension granted by the High Court of Justice expires on August 21 and the government must evict settlers from Migron.
Yesterday’s orchestrated visit of Mitt Romney will do little to buttress Netanyahu’s fragile position. Settler advocacy of a single state for Jews inclusive of the West Bank—something near to an apartheid state—will not play well among American Jews, who want to believe that Israel shares their democratic values. It will damage American security interests, is likely to erode American support for Israel, and could even backfire on Romney’s campaign. Among Israelis, the financial costs of underwriting the settlers are a growing concern.
Regarding the Palestinian Authority, in our opinion they missed a precious opportunity when President Abbas canceled the meeting with Mofaz in Ramallah earlier this month. The Palestinians could have seen Mofaz as a potential peace partner, but things were handled clumsily from the outset. The demonstrations by Ramallah residents against Mofaz could have been anticipated, given Mofaz’s past military record in putting down the Second Intifada with brutal effectiveness. This suggests that the location was poorly chosen and that a venue outside of the region—perhaps in Europe—would have better served the purpose of beginning exploratory talks.
The Palestinians have yet to learn the subtleties of Israeli coalition politics and how to use them to their advantage. Netanyahu’s desire to keep Mofaz in the coalition could have been played as leverage to exact concessions. Mofaz joined the coalition to achieve four objectives, among them the end of the Haredi exemption and a deal with the Palestinians. Hence, once the Palestinians saw that Netanyahu needed Mofaz to cave in on the issue of Haredi exemptions, they could have signaled to Netanyahu that they would have entertained a concession to advance the peace process—a substantial prisoner release, for example—to enable Mofaz save face with his Kadima party. If Netanyahu had obliged to keep Mofaz in the government, hundreds of Palestinians might be walking free today.
In sum, the Palestinians would do well to respond with more alacrity to opportunities to negotiate with an Israeli government whose intransigence disguises deep fractures. Doing so can reap unexpected dividends.
Meanwhile, in our view the Palestinian Authority is correct to proceed with its effort to achieve recognition as a non-member state by the UN General Assembly. Doing so will lay the groundwork for meaningful negotiations where the deck is not stacked in Israel’s favor. While Israeli proposals for the borders of a Palestinian state are likely to be based on the route of the security barrier, UN recognition will be of a state based on the 1967 borders. In the Citizens Proposal we take the position that the border of a viable Palestinian state, where the population can live in a contiguous territory with room for natural population growth, and the border of Israel, one that recognizes the investment of Jews who live in the larger settlements, must take into account both positions.
