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Security and Borders: Both Required for Peace
December 14, 2012
Security is enhanced through good borders. As the adage goes, “Good fences make good neighbors.” When Israel and the Palestinians have a fixed border that both sides can accept, that in itself will contribute greatly towards a positive security environment for Israel. A border between Israel and the West Bank will produce a safer and more secure Israel, safer and more secure than what can be gained through occupation, annexation, or expansion of settlements in the West Bank.
Borders and security together will achieve peace, but neither one can achieve peace by itself. A border alone cannot deliver peace, as security concerns cannot be gainsaid, but neither can a policy that focuses on security alone bring peace. As twin pillars of Israeli policy, borders and security would complement each other to promote peace. In other words, the cry from some corners of Israel that a negotiated border with Palestine is inimical to Israel’s security is based on a false dichotomy. Borders and security are not opposed to each other; rather, they support each other.
How a Border Enhances Security
An agreed-upon border with the Palestinians on the West Bank will enhance Israel’s security environment in numerous ways.
First, an agreed-upon border will remove a huge swathe of frictions between Israel and the Palestinians, including those arising from competition for land rights and resources, from the innumerable indignities suffered due to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands, and from the Palestinians’ existential anxiety over whether they can have a future. Currently the Palestinian population in the West Bank is managing their behavior in response to these frictions without violence, but if there is no improvement, Palestinian patience may one day run out. When that day comes, Israel could face renewed violence and painful loss of life.
Conversely, establishing a border will greatly reduce the propensity for Palestinians to resort to violence as a response to such unmet needs. Instead, the possibility of settled life within defined borders will open doors to increased economic development, trade, and joint projects. It will enhance all manner of cross-border human relationships and friendships amongst people with ties in both nations. It will clarify citizenship and residency issues for thousands who for years have lived in legal limbo. Thus, the settled environment of an established border can promote many virtuous links between the two peoples. In time, these developments could bring Israelis and Palestinians to regard each other no longer as enemies but as partners.
Second, an agreed-upon border will improve Israel’s security by enhancing the effectiveness of its military. It will enable a strategic redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) along shorter and more defensible lines. It will improve morale among IDF troops by relieving them of the moral burden of enforcing an occupation that runs contrary to Jewish values and by eliminating friction with settlers and their private militias. Further, it will allow a reduction in Israel’s defense budget and give a needed economic boost to Israel’s suffering middle class.
A border would not have to compromise Israel’s military readiness to counter enemies east of the Jordan River. As part of a comprehensive final status agreement, Israel can certainly negotiate a bilateral agreement with the new Palestinian state to lease land for radar installations and forward bases, to secure fly-over rights over Palestinian airspace, and to permit movement of troops through Palestine in the event of war.
Third, setting up an agreed-upon border and ending the occupation of the West Bank will also enhance Israel’s security by improving its international standing. This will enable Israel to achieve numerous diplomatic goals linked to security, including upgraded relations with neighboring Arab states that would enhance the formation of a unified front against the threat from a nuclear Iran. It will contribute to the marginalization of Hamas and to the prospects of regime change in Gaza, as Palestinians there see the benefits that peace brings to the West Bank. A comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority will also put Israel in a stronger position to deal with Hezbollah and Syria.
The West Bank Barrier Fence and Security
Good fences can make for good neighbors, but poorly conceived fences and fences built on disputed land create conflict. Israel’s West Bank barrier fence was intended in the first place as a bulwark against terrorism. Supporters of the fence point to the decline in terrorist attacks since its construction as evidence that it is fulfilling its security purpose. However, this statistical decline may have little to do with the fence, as it could just as well be attributed to Palestinian self-restraint after the end of the Second Intifada.
If the security fence had simply followed the 1947 armistice line, a line agreed to by the Palestinians, it might conceivably have made for good neighborly relations and good security as well. However, this purpose was compromised when the route of the security fence was adjusted to support settlements deep inside the West Bank. Today, instead of hewing close to the 1947 armistice line, the security fence carves out large swathes of the West Bank around the Israeli settlements there. This unilateral action by Israel cannot be said to have created a border, because there is no agreement from the other side. Furthermore, Palestinian complaints that the fence has severed families from their lands and destroyed their agricultural base largely arise in areas where the route of the fence supports the settlements.
The Settlements and Security
Today, the settler movement has clearly emerged as the greatest obstacle to the sort of border we envisage between Israel and Palestine, one that both sides could reasonably be expected to agree to. If, as argued above, a border is in the best interests of Israel’s national security, then Israel’s felt responsibility to protect the security of the settlements is profoundly at odds with its security as a nation.
Nevertheless, many Israelis identify the settler movement with Israel’s security. This has roots in Israel’s history going back to its founding. During Israel’s war for independence, Jewish settlements were the front line and Jewish settlers bore the brunt of Arab attacks. After the 1967 war when Israel gained control over the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, intrepid Jews quickly established settlements, both kibbutzim and military encampments, to establish Israeli sovereignty over the newly won territory. The West Bank kibbutzim on the Jordan River and the settlements established in the Golan became the new front line, looking out at potentially hostile Jordan and Syria. Some West Bank settlements, such as Ariel, were approved because they stood at strategic locations to block possible invasion routes from Jordan. Still others, notably those in the Etzion Bloc southwest of Jerusalem, were set up to reestablish Jewish communities that had been driven out or massacred during the war for independence. By establishing Israeli presence on its borders with the Arab states, these settlements were thus an integral part of Israel’s security apparatus.
The rationale for certain settlements, notably suburbs in Jerusalem's eastern environs such as Gilo and Pisgat Ze’ev, made a plausible link between security and territorial expansion. Israel’s experience in its war of independence was that Jerusalem, because of its geographical penetration into the West Bank, was difficult to defend. It was therefore understood that a larger metropolitan area around Jerusalem under Israeli control would enhance the city’s security.
However, at some point in the 1980s, the settler movement began to influence Israeli thinking towards the dream of a national destiny in which the entire occupied West Bank would be transformed into a Jewish nation. The dream of Jews living throughout the biblical territories of “Judea and Samaria” was alluring to many. Movements like Gush Emunim established settlements in the West Bank, not for security but for the dream of a Jewish West Bank. Yet one would be hard-pressed to make a cogent case for how pursuing this dream enhances Israel’s national security, given the presence of 2.3 million Palestinians there as against 300,000 Jewish settlers.
Meanwhile, other settlements were developed as real estate ventures to attract home buyers and renters by offering inexpensive housing. Many of the residents in these settlements are not there for ideology, but for economic reasons. Again, it can hardly be said that such settlements enhance Israel’s national security.
Thus, today the nature of settlement movement, which at its inception was an integral part of Israeli national security strategy, has so changed that it can no longer be said to serve a national security purpose. Nevertheless, the historical connection between the settlements and security remains a potent idea in the minds of many Israelis. Therefore, it is important for Israel to take a sober look at the security implications of the settlements, particularly in light of the considerable security benefit that would accrue from establishing a true border. It is time to decouple the settlements from security and instead look at the settlements within the framework of Israel’s overall security needs.
Israel has a responsibility to protect its citizens in the settlements. Nevertheless, protecting settlers does not necessarily require that all settlements be included within the State of Israel. For those settlers who end up living within a new Palestinian state, Israel and Palestine should work out security guarantees by treaty. Namely, persistence of settlement communities in the West Bank need not stand in the way of a border.
In the current negotiations, we ask Israel to reconsider its stance that security concerns should be paramount, particularly if security is understood as a euphemism for protecting the political interests of the settler movement. In fact the settler movement does not benefit Israel’s security but instead complicates it.
A focus entirely on security while ignoring the issue of borders will bring neither peace nor security. Rather, let the government of Israel change its focus to arriving at an agreement on borders. Once a border is established and security is managed in the context of two states, there can be lasting peace indeed.
Security is enhanced through good borders. As the adage goes, “Good fences make good neighbors.” When Israel and the Palestinians have a fixed border that both sides can accept, that in itself will contribute greatly towards a positive security environment for Israel. A border between Israel and the West Bank will produce a safer and more secure Israel, safer and more secure than what can be gained through occupation, annexation, or expansion of settlements in the West Bank.
Borders and security together will achieve peace, but neither one can achieve peace by itself. A border alone cannot deliver peace, as security concerns cannot be gainsaid, but neither can a policy that focuses on security alone bring peace. As twin pillars of Israeli policy, borders and security would complement each other to promote peace. In other words, the cry from some corners of Israel that a negotiated border with Palestine is inimical to Israel’s security is based on a false dichotomy. Borders and security are not opposed to each other; rather, they support each other.
How a Border Enhances Security
An agreed-upon border with the Palestinians on the West Bank will enhance Israel’s security environment in numerous ways.
First, an agreed-upon border will remove a huge swathe of frictions between Israel and the Palestinians, including those arising from competition for land rights and resources, from the innumerable indignities suffered due to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands, and from the Palestinians’ existential anxiety over whether they can have a future. Currently the Palestinian population in the West Bank is managing their behavior in response to these frictions without violence, but if there is no improvement, Palestinian patience may one day run out. When that day comes, Israel could face renewed violence and painful loss of life.
Conversely, establishing a border will greatly reduce the propensity for Palestinians to resort to violence as a response to such unmet needs. Instead, the possibility of settled life within defined borders will open doors to increased economic development, trade, and joint projects. It will enhance all manner of cross-border human relationships and friendships amongst people with ties in both nations. It will clarify citizenship and residency issues for thousands who for years have lived in legal limbo. Thus, the settled environment of an established border can promote many virtuous links between the two peoples. In time, these developments could bring Israelis and Palestinians to regard each other no longer as enemies but as partners.
Second, an agreed-upon border will improve Israel’s security by enhancing the effectiveness of its military. It will enable a strategic redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) along shorter and more defensible lines. It will improve morale among IDF troops by relieving them of the moral burden of enforcing an occupation that runs contrary to Jewish values and by eliminating friction with settlers and their private militias. Further, it will allow a reduction in Israel’s defense budget and give a needed economic boost to Israel’s suffering middle class.
A border would not have to compromise Israel’s military readiness to counter enemies east of the Jordan River. As part of a comprehensive final status agreement, Israel can certainly negotiate a bilateral agreement with the new Palestinian state to lease land for radar installations and forward bases, to secure fly-over rights over Palestinian airspace, and to permit movement of troops through Palestine in the event of war.
Third, setting up an agreed-upon border and ending the occupation of the West Bank will also enhance Israel’s security by improving its international standing. This will enable Israel to achieve numerous diplomatic goals linked to security, including upgraded relations with neighboring Arab states that would enhance the formation of a unified front against the threat from a nuclear Iran. It will contribute to the marginalization of Hamas and to the prospects of regime change in Gaza, as Palestinians there see the benefits that peace brings to the West Bank. A comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority will also put Israel in a stronger position to deal with Hezbollah and Syria.
The West Bank Barrier Fence and Security
Good fences can make for good neighbors, but poorly conceived fences and fences built on disputed land create conflict. Israel’s West Bank barrier fence was intended in the first place as a bulwark against terrorism. Supporters of the fence point to the decline in terrorist attacks since its construction as evidence that it is fulfilling its security purpose. However, this statistical decline may have little to do with the fence, as it could just as well be attributed to Palestinian self-restraint after the end of the Second Intifada.
If the security fence had simply followed the 1947 armistice line, a line agreed to by the Palestinians, it might conceivably have made for good neighborly relations and good security as well. However, this purpose was compromised when the route of the security fence was adjusted to support settlements deep inside the West Bank. Today, instead of hewing close to the 1947 armistice line, the security fence carves out large swathes of the West Bank around the Israeli settlements there. This unilateral action by Israel cannot be said to have created a border, because there is no agreement from the other side. Furthermore, Palestinian complaints that the fence has severed families from their lands and destroyed their agricultural base largely arise in areas where the route of the fence supports the settlements.
The Settlements and Security
Today, the settler movement has clearly emerged as the greatest obstacle to the sort of border we envisage between Israel and Palestine, one that both sides could reasonably be expected to agree to. If, as argued above, a border is in the best interests of Israel’s national security, then Israel’s felt responsibility to protect the security of the settlements is profoundly at odds with its security as a nation.
Nevertheless, many Israelis identify the settler movement with Israel’s security. This has roots in Israel’s history going back to its founding. During Israel’s war for independence, Jewish settlements were the front line and Jewish settlers bore the brunt of Arab attacks. After the 1967 war when Israel gained control over the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, intrepid Jews quickly established settlements, both kibbutzim and military encampments, to establish Israeli sovereignty over the newly won territory. The West Bank kibbutzim on the Jordan River and the settlements established in the Golan became the new front line, looking out at potentially hostile Jordan and Syria. Some West Bank settlements, such as Ariel, were approved because they stood at strategic locations to block possible invasion routes from Jordan. Still others, notably those in the Etzion Bloc southwest of Jerusalem, were set up to reestablish Jewish communities that had been driven out or massacred during the war for independence. By establishing Israeli presence on its borders with the Arab states, these settlements were thus an integral part of Israel’s security apparatus.
The rationale for certain settlements, notably suburbs in Jerusalem's eastern environs such as Gilo and Pisgat Ze’ev, made a plausible link between security and territorial expansion. Israel’s experience in its war of independence was that Jerusalem, because of its geographical penetration into the West Bank, was difficult to defend. It was therefore understood that a larger metropolitan area around Jerusalem under Israeli control would enhance the city’s security.
However, at some point in the 1980s, the settler movement began to influence Israeli thinking towards the dream of a national destiny in which the entire occupied West Bank would be transformed into a Jewish nation. The dream of Jews living throughout the biblical territories of “Judea and Samaria” was alluring to many. Movements like Gush Emunim established settlements in the West Bank, not for security but for the dream of a Jewish West Bank. Yet one would be hard-pressed to make a cogent case for how pursuing this dream enhances Israel’s national security, given the presence of 2.3 million Palestinians there as against 300,000 Jewish settlers.
Meanwhile, other settlements were developed as real estate ventures to attract home buyers and renters by offering inexpensive housing. Many of the residents in these settlements are not there for ideology, but for economic reasons. Again, it can hardly be said that such settlements enhance Israel’s national security.
Thus, today the nature of settlement movement, which at its inception was an integral part of Israeli national security strategy, has so changed that it can no longer be said to serve a national security purpose. Nevertheless, the historical connection between the settlements and security remains a potent idea in the minds of many Israelis. Therefore, it is important for Israel to take a sober look at the security implications of the settlements, particularly in light of the considerable security benefit that would accrue from establishing a true border. It is time to decouple the settlements from security and instead look at the settlements within the framework of Israel’s overall security needs.
Israel has a responsibility to protect its citizens in the settlements. Nevertheless, protecting settlers does not necessarily require that all settlements be included within the State of Israel. For those settlers who end up living within a new Palestinian state, Israel and Palestine should work out security guarantees by treaty. Namely, persistence of settlement communities in the West Bank need not stand in the way of a border.
In the current negotiations, we ask Israel to reconsider its stance that security concerns should be paramount, particularly if security is understood as a euphemism for protecting the political interests of the settler movement. In fact the settler movement does not benefit Israel’s security but instead complicates it.
A focus entirely on security while ignoring the issue of borders will bring neither peace nor security. Rather, let the government of Israel change its focus to arriving at an agreement on borders. Once a border is established and security is managed in the context of two states, there can be lasting peace indeed.
